UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006 

[Congressional Record: July 26, 2006 (House)]
[Page H5902-H5930]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr26jy06-116]

UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 947 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5682.

{time} 1731

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India,
with Mr. Duncan in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)

[[Page H5903]]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S.-
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, which the Committee on
International Relations ordered reported by a vote of 37-5 on June 28.
This, therefore, is truly a bipartisan effort.
This bill is based on the administration's original proposal, H.R.
4974, which Mr. Lantos and I introduced last fall at the request of
Secretary Rice. Current law does not permit civil nuclear trade with
India. That legislation would have authorized the President to waive a
number of provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to
allow him to negotiate an agreement establishing civil nuclear
cooperation with India.
This agreement will permit the U.S. to sell technology to India for
nuclear power development. In return, India will open up for inspection
its civilian nuclear program to international inspections and also
agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide by nuclear export controls.
H.R. 5682 takes the President's bill as a starting point and amends
it in several key ways. The most important of these is that the process
of congressional consideration has been reversed, meaning that the
agreement cannot go into effect unless Congress approves it. This
seemingly small change actually has great ramifications for the role of
Congress as it ensures that we will retain a substantive role in the
negotiation and implementation of this historic and far-reaching
agreement.
Other major improvements in this bill include strengthening the
conditions which the President must certify. The original, vague
generalities have been made more specific and require a number of
conditions to have already been met instead of being open-ended. The
most important of these include:
That India has provided the United States and the International
Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to separate its civilian and
military facilities;
India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA regarding
its civilian nuclear facilities;
India and the IAEA are making ``substantial progress'' toward
concluding an Additional Protocol, which is a set of enhanced
safeguards and inspection measures that the United States is urging all
countries to negotiate for themselves;
India and the United States are working toward a multilateral Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty;
India is working with the United States to prevent the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology;
India is taking steps to secure its nuclear and other sensitive
materials and technology through enhanced export control legislation
and harmonizing its export control laws, regulations and procedures
with international standards; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also
known as the NSG, has voted to change its guidelines to allow civil
nuclear trade with India.
As many of you know, the NSG is a voluntary group of countries that
export nuclear materials and technology and that coordinate their
export policies regarding other countries. Currently, those guidelines
do not permit nuclear trade with India.
In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual reports on the
implementation of the U.S.-India agreement and on U.S. nonproliferation
policy with respect to South Asia. There are also sections on Sense of
Congress and Statements of Policy that, although containing many useful
provisions, I will not take the time to describe in detail now.
Taken together, the committee believes that this bill represents a
judicious balancing of competing priorities and will help lay the
foundation for an historic rapprochement between the United States and
India, while also protecting the global nonproliferation regime.
Having described the major components of the bill, let me take a
brief moment to address some of the arguments made by supporters and
opponents.
I have yet to hear any objection raised by any Member regarding the
desirability of improving U.S.-India relations in general. She is the
largest democracy in the world, with 1.1 billion people.
The announcement on July 18 of last year by President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Singh of a new global partnership between our two
countries has been almost universally praised in this country and is
rightly regarded as an historic achievement and one that is long
overdue.
That partnership embraces many elements, from combating the AIDS
epidemic to collaboration on scientific research to closer cooperation
and ensuring stability in South Asia and other regions. Among other
benefits, the agreement on nuclear cooperation that this bill will make
possible will help India address its pressing energy needs by allowing
it to build several nuclear reactors to supply electricity and
lessening the need for petroleum.
A major argument in favor, however, is that a closer relationship
with India is needed to offset the rising power of China. There is much
to this view, and it is clear that the U.S. will need to draw upon new
resources to handle the challenges of this new century.
In the end, this is a good deal for both the U.S. and India. While
the world has known that India possesses nuclear weapons, India has not
had a seat at the table of nuclear stakeholders. The agreement calls
for the U.S. to sell technology to India for nuclear power development.
In return, India will open its 14 civilian nuclear reactors to
international inspections, agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide
by nuclear export controls. This brings India into the mainstream with
other accountable countries, giving rise to the same benefits and
responsibilities as such other countries.
It is important to note that this deal would improve international
nuclear security and at the same time expand relations between the U.S.
and one of the most important emerging nations in the world. It will
enable India to make energy cheaper, cleaner and more accountable. It
would create more customers for U.S. firms and, in the end, both
countries will benefit.
I urge support of this important legislation.
I want to acknowledge the indispensable collaboration of Mr. Lantos
and his marvelous staff, matched only in talent and zeal by my
marvelous staff. This is truly a product of very desirable
bipartisanship, and I thank them and salute them for their
contribution.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation. This is no
ordinary vote. Historians will regard what we do today as a tidal shift
in relations between India and the United States. This will be known as
the day when Congress signaled definitively the end of the Cold War
paradigm governing interactions between New Delhi and Washington.
A few weeks ago, by a vote of 37-5, the International Relations
Committee resoundingly approved this legislation backing the civilian
nuclear accord with India. This was nothing short of a vote of
confidence in the long-term future of relations between India and the
United States.
President Clinton laid the foundation for this process with his
historic trip to India 6 years ago. He demonstrated that the United
States was launching a new era of mutual respect and cooperation.
A year ago, this vision was brought to full realization as the
President and Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on an array
of new initiatives spanning the fields of high technology, space
exploration, counterterrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
Today, Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives steps forth into
the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new
relationship, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act of 2006, the first key step to create the statutory authority to
expand nuclear research, civilian nuclear power and nonproliferation
cooperation New Delhi.
Our legislation represents a nonproliferation victory for the United
States. As part of the agreement, India has committed to continue its
moratorium on its own nuclear tests. It will also adhere to
international nuclear and missile control restrictions, and India has
agreed to place its civil nuclear facilities for the first time under
international safeguards.
Mr. Chairman, this, of course, is not a perfect agreement. No
agreement between two sovereign nations can ever

[[Page H5904]]

be perfect, because the agreements arise from hard negotiations.
Compromise was necessary on all sides. But we must not let the siren
song of perfection deafen us to this chance for dramatically
strengthening an important and valued ally.

{time} 1745

Mr. Chairman, I understand the criticisms of this agreement on
nonproliferation grounds. But I would like to assure the House that the
International Relations Committee has thoroughly examined these issues
during our five extensive hearings since last September on this
initiative.
And, Mr. Chairman, our bill addresses those concerns thoroughly. It
requires the President to make several determinations to Congress.
Among these, the President must determine that India has concluded a
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities;
that India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency that will apply safeguards in perpetuity to
India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs; that India
is harmonizing its export control laws and regulations to match those
of the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that India is actively
supporting U.S. efforts to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.
It is worth repeating, Mr. Chairman, that the International Relations
Committee came to the determination that this agreement advances our
Nation's nonproliferation goals, and our committee approved the bill by
an overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 37-5.
Mr. Chairman, this legislation has been carefully crafted to protect
our nonproliferation interests, and to ensure direct congressional
oversight. Members will recall that the administration wanted Congress
to approve the India deal in advance, without seeing the details of a
still-to-be-negotiated nuclear cooperation agreement.
There would have been no effective subsequent review by the Congress.
We rejected that approach. Our agreement ensures that Congress will
have the final word on whether or not the agreement for cooperation
with India can become law. Under our approach, Congress must vote a
second time before there can be any civilian nuclear cooperation with
India.
Congress must approve the completed cooperation agreement. But
congressional oversight does not end there, Mr. Chairman. Our
legislation also requires that the President make detailed annual
reports on U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to South Asia and
the implementation of the U.S.-India agreement. And it includes certain
guarantees that India will adhere to international standards for
maintaining a safe civilian nuclear program.
Mr. Chairman, it is my deep pleasure to see the United States and
India finally emerging from decades of distrust and aloofness. Today,
we are at the hinge of history, as we seek to build a fundamentally new
relationship based on our common values and our common interests.
Our legislation, which is before this House, is a concrete and
meaningful element of this new and dynamic relationship. I urge my
colleagues to give their full support to this legislation and to help
usher in a new day in U.S.-India relations.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos
for their hard work on this bill. I think they have covered the details
of the bill rather well.
The reason I wanted to take 1 minute was to say that I met with Prime
Minister Singh in Delhi, India, along with some of his cabinet members,
oh, a couple of months ago.
And although I have not always been in accord with some of things
India has done, I am sure that they want to work with us on this
nuclear agreement. They have assured me, and I am confident they will
keep their word, that there will be a clear demarcation between civil
use of nuclear energy, nuclear technology we might sell to them and
their nuclear weapons program.
And there is about 800 million people in India that are living on
less than $2 a day. And when you go through Delhi and you see how they
are living, under horrible, horrible conditions, little children
running around with no place to go, burning cow chips for the heat that
they need to stay warm at night, you realize the need for energy that
they have and they need it so badly.
So this nuclear technology we are going to sell them for civil use
will be very helpful, not only for job creation over there, but for
making the quality of life better for all the people in India.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Davis) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.
(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682,
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
Mr. Chairman, ``India,'' Mark Twain wrote, ``is the cradle of the
human race, the birthplace of human speech, the mother of history, the
grandmother of legend, and the great grandmother of tradition.'' Now,
this remarkable country is asking for our assistance as it develops its
civilian nuclear program.
The possibilities for nuclear technological innovation in India are
limitless. Domestic infrastructure improvements in water supply, power
generation, and other industries will substantially improve the quality
of life for over one billion Indian people.
Cooperating with India as it develops stable nuclear technology will
strengthen the bond between India and the United States. Offering our
expertise will increase the environmental protections in production and
promote the responsible discard of nuclear waste. Bringing India's
nuclear program under international guidelines will ensure a safer
nuclear program.
The security and stability of India's nuclear program security is of
the utmost importance. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Indian Government have been working together to apply safeguards in
accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency practices as well as
formulating a plan to ensure the separation of civil and military
facilities, materials, and programs. Furthermore, India is supporting
international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technology. India is ensuring that the necessary steps are
being taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through the
application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.
India is a flourishing democracy that seeks to develop its nuclear
program for purely peaceful reasons. It should be congratulated for
that. Cooperating with India as it develops a civilian nuclear program
will help India fulfill its civilian energy needs while creating a
strategic partner for the United States in a volatile region.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Berman) our distinguished colleague who has made
invaluable contributions to the development of this legislation.
(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman and the
ranking member of the committee, both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos, and
their staffs for their hard work on this legislation.
There is no question that this bill is a major improvement over the
administration's legislative proposal, as Mr. Lantos mentioned. Because
of the changes they have made, we will have an opportunity to decide
whether or not to approve the nuclear cooperation agreement by a
majority vote after the agreement is negotiated, after we see the IAEA
safeguards agreement with India, and after the Nuclear Suppliers Group
has reached a consensus.
Notwithstanding that, I do remain deeply concerned about this nuclear
deal, because I fear that it will complicate our efforts to prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. Not because I think India is
going to be a major proliferator, but because once you change the long-
established nonproliferation rules for the benefit of one country, even
a friendly democracy like India, then it becomes much easier for the
other countries to justify carve-outs for their special friends.
I would not be so concerned about setting a bad precedent if there
was some compelling nonproliferation gain, but I just do not see it
here. Later today, Representative Tauscher and I will offer an
amendment to provide

[[Page H5905]]

that missing piece of the proposal. Our amendment, based on a proposal
by former Senator Sam Nunn, would allow exports of nuclear reactors and
other technology to India after a nuclear cooperation agreement has
been approved by the Congress.
But it would restrict exports of uranium and other nuclear reactor
fuel, until the President determines that India has halted the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Otherwise,
we incentivize this.
Mr. Chairman, I come at this as someone who is unabashedly pro-India.
I strongly support efforts to strengthen the U.S.-India strategic
partnership. I also accept the fact that India has nuclear weapons,
will never give up those weapons, and will probably never sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome civilian nuclear cooperation with India, as
long as it is done in a responsible way that does not undermine our
credibility as a leader in the fight against proliferation. I believe
the Tauscher-Berman amendment will help to achieve that goal.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce).
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
legislation, allowing for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
The last two administrations have forged closer ties with India. And
India is a nation now of over 1 billion people. The last two
administrations frankly have overcome the chilly relations of the Cold
War with India.
And last July's joint statement committed each country to a global
partnership which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues,
including on counterterrorism. As we saw 2 weeks ago, when a series of
commuter train bombings hit Mumbai, killing over 200 Indian people,
India is a frontline state in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.
Congress has played a leading role promoting U.S.-India relations.
There is an India Caucus which I cochaired in the 107th Congress. In
2001, I led a congressional delegation to India's earthquake-shattered
Gujarat region. Other Members have focused on India. But nothing we
have done is as significant as the civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement that we are debating today.
As our distinguished chairman has noted, the International Relations
Committee has given this agreement close and extensive review. We held
five hearings, which is certainly warranted given the high stakes.
Supporters and detractors alike recognize the great significance of
this policy shift that the Bush administration has engineered. I would
like to commend Chairman Hyde. He took a weak administration
legislative proposal, one dismissive of congressional prerogative and
turned it around. I want to commend Ranking Member Lantos, too, for his
detailed work on this challenging issue.
While nuclear energy is controversial in the United States, it is not
in India. Like in several other countries, nuclear energy is widely
viewed as a critical technology, one central to uplifting hundreds of
millions of impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear
energy sector, not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it
will nonetheless. And India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at
this point in time, which is understandable, given its security
situation.
So right now, many Indians view the United States as blocking India's
technological and developmental aspirations by our opposition to their
acquiring nuclear material and technology. With its growing economy,
India is consuming more and more oil. It is competing on the world
market, competing with American consumers for limited hydrocarbon
resources.
This gives Americans an interest in helping India expand its nuclear
power industry, which this legislation does. It also encourages India
to move away from burning its abundance of highly polluting coal. By
passing this legislation, we also take a step toward internationalizing
India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make it safer.
Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field are
interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today
they are isolated. I would rather know more rather than less about
India's nuclear work. Some have raised legitimate concerns about the
impact of this agreement upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal. I am not prepared, at this point,
to call this agreement a nonproliferation plus, as some do, but neither
is it the clear setback some opponents describe.
For one, this agreement forces a separation between India's civilian
and military nuclear programs. This is a good step. The agreement also
is likely to increase India's cooperation with us in confronting
countries seeking to break their NPT commitment by developing nuclear
weapons.
In my view, this agreement is more likely a wash in the
nonproliferation category, while its broad benefits, primarily
cultivating a more influential relationship with India, are big pluses.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to distinguished
Democratic whip, my good friend from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

{time} 1800

Mr. HOYER. I thank Mr. Lantos for yielding the time, Mr. Chairman. I
support this important bipartisan legislation, and I urge my colleagues
to do the same.
It is critical to note that this bill creates a two-vote process for
Congress to approve this Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with
India. While the bill allows the necessary waivers to the Atomic Energy
Act for this pact, it also requires that the President submit a final
agreement to Congress for a second up or down vote. I want to
congratulate the gentleman from California for getting us a process
that gives us that opportunity.
In short, I believe a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India
will serve America's strategic interests and strengthen global
nonproliferation regimes by bringing the majority of India's nuclear
reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight for the
first time.
In addition, this bill will strengthen the relationship between our
two great democracies. A civilian nuclear agreement will help India's
burgeoning economy continue to grow, and it will provide India with a
clean source of energy.
Now, it is true that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, an international accord that I strongly
support. But it is also true that India has honored the spirit of that
treaty and has been a responsible nuclear nation for the past 32 years,
unlike Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, I might observe.
Under this bill, the President is allowed to waive provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act only after he sends Congress a determination that
India has a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear
facilities. The President must also send to Congress a determination of
an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring that agency to
safeguard in perpetuity India's civil nuclear facilities, materials,
and programs. In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual
reports on the implementation of this agreement.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the House bill represents a policy that
recognizes our Indian allies' responsible actions over more than three
decades and our two nations' strong and deepening relationship. I thank
the gentleman from California and Mr. Royce for their work on this bill
and rise, as I said at the outset, in support of it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation
which will further the cause of civilian nuclear cooperation with
India, and I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Chairman Hyde for the
work that they put into this, again demonstrating the bipartisan
cooperation that is possible even in the arena of international affairs
which sometimes gets rather testy.
Let me note that the United States-India relations got off to a very
bad start shortly after India became independent of Great Britain.
India basically sided with Russia in the Cold War. Well, the Cold War
is over, and we should be making up for lost time, which is exactly
what this bill is all about.
This is dramatically in the interests of both of our countries.
Economically,

[[Page H5906]]

a prosperous, democratic India with an expanding middle class is a
dream market for American entrepreneurs, manufacturers and, yes,
technologists. This agreement is designed to provide India the energy
it needs to achieve its economic goals but in a way that will not
damage America or other western democracies' economy by fencing off and
consuming limited energy resources or using high-pollution energy
resources of their own.
The high-temperature gas reactor, my subcommittee had a hearing on
this, noting that there are new nuclear alternatives like the high-
temperature gas reactor and other type of nuclear power systems that
offer a safe method of providing India the energy it needs to uplift
the standard of living of its people. This legislation is pro-
prosperity, pro-energy; and, if we are vigilant, it will not be
contrary to the interests of the nonproliferation movement. But it is
up to us to work with India to make sure that nonproliferation remains
a high priority for our countries, both of us together.
Finally, let me note, Mr. Chairman, that we need to have a strong
relationship for it with India, yes, with Japan and, yes, with the
former Soviet Union, if we are to have peace in this world. There is a
danger looming in the future. Hopefully, China will some day
democratize. Until then, we must have alliances with the world's
democracies like India in order to preserve the peace of the world.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to my
good friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a distinguished colleague and
valued member of the International Relations Committee.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, today the House has an opportunity to
make an historic choice of great proportions. For 30 years, Mr.
Chairman, U.S. policy toward India has been defined and constrained by
our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign decision not to
sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The truth be told, had India conducted its nuclear tests earlier, it
would have been treated the way we treat France and Britain and Russia
and China and ourselves. In short, it would have been grandfathered in
as a member of the nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier,
and they have been treated differently. And nothing that we have tried
over the last three decades has convinced them to give up their nuclear
status, and nothing that we would say over the next three decades would
convince them, either.
The time has come for the United States to deal with the reality of
South Asia as it is and not as a fanciful wish. India lives in a
difficult neighborhood, next to Pakistan, which continues to produce
nuclear weapons unchecked, and China, whose commitment to a fissile
material cutoff is suspect, at best. If India didn't exist in that
neighborhood, we would have to invent them.
India has been a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated
that way. The bill before us does just that.
Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our
nonproliferation policy; and, clearly Iran, Pakistan and North Korea
are looking for clues as to what it means for them and their nuclear
programs.
What do you tell Pakistan and Iran and North Korea? Well, you tell
them this: If you want to be treated like India, be like India. Be a
responsible international actor with regard to weapons of mass
destruction technologies. Don't sell your nuclear technologies to the
highest bidder. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy, a real
democracy like India, and work with us on important foreign policy
objectives and not against us.
Iran and North Korea signed the NPT and are now running away from
their freely entered into obligation and away from IAEA inspections.
India did not sign the NPT, and yet is embracing the IAEA and embracing
global nonproliferation. India's attitude should be recognized and
commended and congratulated.
There are two options before us today: One, don't pass the bill. We
do that, and we allow India to pursue its national interests unimpeded,
as it has been doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream.
The other is to make a deal with India and give to the United States
and the international community a window in perpetuity into two-thirds
of India's nuclear facilities and all of its future nuclear facilities,
under safeguards, in compliance, transparent.
I think the choice is clear: If you want the IAEA to inspect India's
civilian nuclear facilities, then you are for the bill. If you want
India to be obligated to adhere to the missile technologies control
regime for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want them
to comply for the first time with the nuclear suppliers' groups
guidelines for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want
to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about how to behave,
then you are for the bill. And, if you want a broad, deep, and enduring
strategic relationship with India, then you are for the bill.
Mr. Chairman, it is time for a 21st century policy towards India, one
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a global, responsible
power and solidifies U.S.-India bilateral relations for decades to
come. The bill before us today is that new policy. I urge our
colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 5682.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as an
original cosponsor of the civilian nuclear agreement. As a member of
the International Relations Committee and past cochair of the
Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, this is an issue I
have enthusiastically supported. I want to thank Chairman Henry Hyde,
Ranking Member Tom Lantos, Chairman Ed Royce, Caucus Cochairs Gary
Ackerman and Joe Crowley, and all other members of the committee who
have crafted well-balanced, bipartisan legislation.
Some incorrectly believe this agreement will have a negative impact
on nonproliferation. In contrast, it will greatly strengthen our
current nonproliferation system. India has long been outside of the
international nonproliferation regimes. Under this agreement, India
will place 14 of 22 existing and planned nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards.
For 30 years, India has protected its nuclear programs. It has not
allowed proliferation of its nuclear technology. India is the world's
largest democracy, with the 11th largest economy. It is treated
uniquely because of its history of maintaining a successful nuclear
nonproliferation regime. I saw firsthand on a visit to India in
December the vibrant future of India as America's partner in the codel
led by Dan Burton.
Passage of this agreement promotes meaningful mutual economic
benefits for India and America. Secretary Rice has noted that as many
as 5,000 direct jobs and 15,000 indirect jobs could be created as a
result of this agreement. In addition, India will be better positioned
to compete in the global economy, and trade between our countries will
continue to grow at a record pace, such as in 2005 when we recorded a
30 percent increase in exports to India.
In conclusion, God bless our troops and we will never forget
September 11.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my
good friend from Nevada (Ms. Berkley) so she may engage in a colloquy.
Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Mr.
Royce for engaging in this colloquy with me.
I fully appreciate the importance and significance of this historic
piece of legislation. However, I rise today to discuss two amendments
that were adopted by the committee.
I am sure that you are all aware that for over 20 years Nevada has
fought to keep nuclear waste out of Yucca Mountain. This is a most
compelling issue for the people of the State of Nevada. I am very
pleased that the committee agreed with my arguments that, before we
enter into any agreement to support a proliferation of nuclear power,
we should know where the nuclear waste is going to be stored.
Nevada certainly doesn't want to store the nuclear waste that is
generated in our own country, much less the nuclear waste that is
generated in other countries, and that includes India.
I am pleased that an amendment that I sponsored ensuring that spent
fuel

[[Page H5907]]

from India's civilian nuclear reactors cannot be transferred to the
United States without congressional oversight, that was passed by the
committee. Another amendment that requires the President to issue an
annual report describing the disposal of nuclear waste from India's
civilian nuclear program was also approved by the committee.
I believe these are critical provisions that the final bill simply
must contain. Both of these provisions passed without objection during
the committee markup of this legislation. I would ask the chairman
whether he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions
in the final bill as the legislative process goes forward.
I yield to the distinguished subcommittee chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I supported the gentlewoman's amendment in committee. And while not
necessarily concurring with all the views that she expressed in
committee, I supported her amendment; and hers are helpful amendments
which I will work to maintain in the final bill.
Ms. BERKLEY. I thank the chairman.
I yield to the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank the gentlewoman for her excellent work on
this legislation. I will do my utmost to work to keep this provision in
the legislation.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time for
closing.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the distinguished
ranking member on our Budget Committee.

{time} 1815

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to engage my colleagues and managers of this bill, Mr.
Royce and Mr. Lantos, in a colloquy on the issue of India's nuclear
testing moratorium.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act provides that, ``No nuclear
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be
exported to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President
to have detonated a nuclear device.'' It is my understanding that
section 4(a)(3)(A) of H.R. 5682 waives this restriction for any nuclear
test that occurred before July 18, 2005, effectively allowing nuclear
cooperation in spite of India's past nuclear tests, but not for any
detonation or tests after that day.
Therefore, if India were to do so, continued nuclear cooperation
would be in jeopardy. Is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina is indeed
correct. It is our intent that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act
should apply prospectively to India. Should India conduct a nuclear
test in the future, one likely consequence would be the discontinuation
of nuclear fuel and technology sharing by the United States with India.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I agree with my friend, Congressman Royce.
Nuclear tests by India would put the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation
agreement in serious jeopardy.
Mr. SPRATT. I thank my colleagues for that clarification. As a
further point of clarification, India's prime minister has reported to
his parliament that, ``the United States will support an Indian effort
to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any
disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactor.'' A sizeable
fuel reserve could conceivably minimize the impact of a U.S. decision
to cut off fuel supplies should India conduct a nuclear test.
Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos, is it your understanding that aiding in the
development of a fuel reserve is not intended to facilitate a decision
by the government of India to resume nuclear testing? I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. ROYCE. That is our understanding.
Mr. LANTOS. And I agree with that interpretation.
Mr. SPRATT. Finally, would the gentlemen then agree with me that any
fuel reserve provided to the Indians for use in safeguarded, civilian
nuclear facilities should be sized in a way that maintains continued
fuel supply as a deterrent to Indian nuclear testing? I yield to the
gentlemen.
Mr. ROYCE. Any fuel reserve should be intended to give India
protections against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear
fuel.
Mr. LANTOS. I agree with Mr. Royce on this point.
Mr. SPRATT. I thank Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos for that clarification
and commend you for your excellent work on this important legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/4\ minutes
to our distinguished colleague from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega),
my good friend.
(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the
U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to
certainly commend Chairman Henry Hyde and Ranking Member Tom Lantos for
their leadership in moving this legislation forward. This proposed
legislation is a classic example of what bipartisanship is all about,
and I, again, commend our chairman and ranking member and their staffs
for their statesmanship and initiative in bringing this bill to the
floor for consideration.
I also want to compliment my colleague from New York (Mr. Ackerman)
for giving our colleagues a little historical perspective about this
whole question of non-proliferation, and I want to share with my
colleagues a historical perspective of why India did not and could not
sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not
signed the NPT, I submit that had it not been for our own country's
indifference, I call it benign neglect, if you will, India may have
been a member of the nuclear club and our discussion about the NPT
would have been a moot point.
In the early 1960s, despite having a civilian nuclear program, India
called for a global disarmament, but nations with nuclear weapons
turned a deaf ear. In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was
responding to border provocation. The United States responded by saying
it might protect India against a future attack, but when China exploded
its first nuclear bomb in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of
the nuclear club, and we also supported China becoming a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council.
It may be of interest to our colleagues, Mr. Chairman, that India had
a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being open for
signatures in 1968, and at the time, India was only months away from
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has
not signed the NPT, I agree with India's position that the NPT is, and
has always been, flawed and discriminatory.
Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its first nuclear
device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified documents on
U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice given the hostile
attitude assumed by our country towards India during the Nixon-
Kissinger years.
I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for bringing this
initiative to the table. I also applaud the effort of Under Secretary
of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in development of
this agreement. He did an outstanding job and showed true
statesmanship.
I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S. and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act and I commend Chairman Henry Hyde and
Ranking Member Tom Lantos for their leadership in moving this
legislation forward. This proposed legislation is a classic example of
what bipartisanship is all about and I again commend our chairman and
ranking member and their staffs for their statesmanship and initiative
in bringing this bill

[[Page H5908]]

to the floor for consideration. I want to share with my colleagues a
historical perspective why India did not and could not sign the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I submit that had it
not been for our country's indifference or, benign neglect, if you
will, India may have been a member of the nuclear club and our
discussion about the NPT would be a moot point. In the early 1960s,
despite having a civilian nuclear program, India called for global
disarmament but nations with nuclear weapons turned a deaf ear.
In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was responding to border
provocation. The U.S. responded by saying it might protect India
against a future attack. But when China exploded its first nuclear bomb
in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of the nuclear club and we
also supported China to become a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. It may be of interest to our colleagues that India
had a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being opened
for signature in 1968 and, at the time, India was only months away from
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has
not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I agree with
India's position that the NPT is, and has always been, flawed and
discriminatory. Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its
first nuclear device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified
documents on U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice
given the hostile attitude assumed by the United States towards India
during the Nixon/Kissinger years.
In 1965, believing India was weakened from its war with China,
Pakistan attacked India. In response, the U.S. remained neutral while
China outspokenly supported Pakistan. Concerned for its own security
and having little reason to rely on the U.S., India announced in 1966
that it would produce nuclear weapons within 18 months. But, in 1967,
the U.S. joined with the Soviet Union in crafting a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty which to this day states that only the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France are permitted to
own nuclear weapons because only these five nations possessed nuclear
weapons at the time the treaty was open for signature in 1968.
As we all can agree, India then and India today lives in one of the
world's toughest regions and it is a bit Eurocentric for the U.S. to
treat India as if she is beholden to us for the safety, protection, and
well-being of her people. It is no grand gesture on our part that we
now offer India civil nuclear cooperation. Instead, U.S.-India civil
nuclear cooperation is long overdue and, quite frankly, the deal is as
good for us as it is for India.
Mr. Chairman, I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for
bringing this initiative to the table. I also applaud the efforts of
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in
the development of this agreement. As the lead negotiator, Secretary
Burns has represented our Nation's interest with distinction and true
statesmanship, and I am honored to have worked with him during these
critical months leading up to today's historic deliberation of this
important bill.
I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian-
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of H.R. 5682.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
rise in support of this legislation and of the growing strategic
partnership between the United States, the world's oldest democracy,
and India, the world's largest. The hard work by Members and the staff
on the IR Committee under the leadership of the chairman and ranking
member have produced a bill that better attempts to address legitimate
nonproliferation concerns and respects congressional authority to
approve agreements.
During the markup, the committee adopted an amendment I offered to
minimize the risk that our nuclear exports would assist India's nuclear
weapons programs.
Under this amendment, the President would be required to submit to
Congress a report on the steps he is taking to ensure our exports do
not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program. In addition, my
amendment declared that it is U.S. policy to encourage India not to
increase its production of fissile material in military facilities.
Taken together with the other statements by the administration, this
amendment makes clear that it is U.S. policy to promote the prompt
negotiation of a fissile material production cutoff treaty; that
pending entry into force of such a treaty, to press for the earliest
possible achievement of a multilateral moratorium to accomplish this
purpose; and to urge India to refrain from increasing its rate of
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, the final bill must contain these provisions, and I
would ask my colleague and the manager of the bill, Mr. Royce, whether
he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions and
their stated intent in the final bill as the legislative process goes
forward.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, yes. I supported the gentleman's amendment
in committee, and I will work with him to maintain it in the final
bill.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his
excellent work on this legislation, and I intend to work to keep this
provision in the legislation.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank both of you gentlemen. I intend to support the
legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my very dear friend and our
most distinguished colleague.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this agreement pours nuclear fuel on the
fire of an India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. This agreement will free
up 40 to 50 bombs worth of nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear bombs, and
the consequence of that will be that Pakistan will respond, and
Pakistan will respond with A.Q. Khan under house arrest in Islamabad,
the Johnny Appleseed of nuclear weapons spread from Iran to Libya to
North Korea.
And how do we know that? We know that because in Monday's Washington
Post we learned from an outside source that Pakistan is building a
facility that can create 50 plutonium nuclear bombs a year. We should
be debating that out here on the House floor tonight.
This House has 2 days to reject a sale of 36 F-16 bombers that can
take the 50 nuclear bombs which Pakistan can make each year in a radius
of 1,500 kilometers, but we are not going to debate that. We are not
going to debate Pakistan's nuclear program, which Congress was not told
about, the American public was not told about.
Who is in Pakistan? A.Q. Khan is in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden is in
Pakistan. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan.
This agreement is going to fuel an arms race, a nuclear arms race in
southeast Asia, and it is going to spread across the world, and instead
of debating an F-16 bill, 36 of them to Pakistan, with this abomination
of a nuclear program which they have, we are instead fueling it with
this India program which Pakistan knows is cynical because it will free
up 50 bombs worth of civilian domestic Indian nuclear fuel for their
bomb program.
We must halt, we must stop this nuclear arms race in southeast Asia.
We must vote ``no'' on this proposal. It is absurd. We should be
debating Pakistan's nuclear program, Pakistan's F-16 program tonight,
or else we will look back on this as an historic failure.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I think we are all very concerned about the reports on Pakistan's
programs that appeared this week. I think it was Monday in the
Washington Post, but I think it is important to also note that that
report stated that the construction on this facility in Pakistan to
make these bombs began sometime in the year 2000. So this is not
something that I think can be characterized as a reaction to this new
initiative with India.
I do have concerns about a nuclear arms buildup in Asia. Again, this
is something that the administration should be doing more on, working
towards a fissile material cutoff treaty.
However, I would just respond by pointing out that this agreement
gives us a chance to be engaged with India on their program instead of
being on the outside as we have been for decades.

[[Page H5909]]

Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purposes of a unanimous consent request
to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Asia
Subcommittee.
(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to recognize
Chairman Hyde and the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, for
their leadership in improving the Administration's draft proposal for
facilitating civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and
India.
In particular, I appreciate their efforts to lessen the
nonproliferation risks inherent in this initiative and to ensure that
Congress remains a full partner with the Executive Branch as we move
forward with this endeavor.
Nonetheless, while the issue at hand is a close call, in my judgment
this particular initiative does not strike the right balance between
two competing American national security interests: the important goal
of improving relations with a rising India and the critical priority of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material in an era
hallmarked by the global threat of terrorism. Let me explain why.
There is nothing more difficult than to attempt to put perspective on
events of day because so many issues can only be understood clearly, if
at all, with the passage of time. For example, if we ask what is new on
the Asian landscape over the last several years there is a tendency to
emphasize troubling developments: the scourge of terrorism, North
Korea, tensions over Taiwan, and America's growing trade deficit with
China. But on the positive side little is more consequential than
America's deepening ties with India.
The growing warmth between our two countries has its roots in the
common values and the increasingly congruent interests of democratic
societies committed to the ideal of liberty, social tolerance,
representative government and the fight against terrorism, as well as
other transnational threats--such as the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, illicit narcotics, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In this
regard all Americans condemn the recent horrific bomb attacks in
Kashmir and Mumbai, and we stand with the people and government of
India in their opposition to anarchistic acts of terror.
Our deepening government-to-government relationship is complemented
by a rich mosaic of expanding people-to-people ties. In many ways, the
more than 2 million Indian-Americans have become a living bridge
between our two great democracies, bringing together our two peoples,
as well as greatly enlarging our understanding of one another.
From a Congressional perspective, it should be underscored that
America's commitment to this robust and multi-faceted relationship is
fully bipartisan. As underscored by the debate on this measure, there
is virtually no dissent in Washington from the precept that India and
the United States should become increasingly close strategic partners
with compelling incentives over time to develop convergent perspectives
on a host of regional and global policy concerns.
By any objective measure, U.S.-India relations have never been on
more solid footing. From new agreements on defense cooperation to
expanded high technology trade and space cooperation, the relationship
has been moving forward in an impressive fashion. On the economic
front, America is India's largest trading partner and largest foreign
investor. In many ways, however, what is impressive is how marginal,
not how significant, is our trade. Economic and commercial ties between
the U.S. and India are at an incipient, not end stage, and arguably
deserve priority emphasis at this point in our relationship.
In this context, many in Washington and elsewhere around the world
were caught by surprise with the Administration's offer last July to
extend full civilian nuclear cooperation to India; a proposal which
presented Congress with a fait accompli, notwithstanding the fact that
implementation would require legislative action.
By background, when Prime Minister Singh was set to visit Washington
last summer, the Administration was weighing two policy options to help
ensure maximum success for this important summit with the President.
One option would have been to announce unequivocal U.S. support for
India's claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council; a stance clearly in the interest of India and also compatible
with the interests of the United States. Bizarrely, however, the
Administration position then and now has been that Washington is
unprepared to take a firm position in support of Indian membership
until the U.S. achieves certain goals related to UN administrative and
management reform, none of which are as critical as the case for
Security Council enlargement to reflect the new balance of power in
world affairs.
Frankly, I am flabbergasted by the Administration's ideological
rigidity, as well as its lack of preparation to support India on this
issue. I regard the U.S. position as awkward philosophically,
illogical, and incompatible with sound strategic judgment.
Instead of supporting India's aspirations for Security Council
membership, the Administration instead chose to peremptorily re-write
the rules of the global nonproliferation that have well-served U.S.
interests for over three decades.
To be sure, I acknowledge that there are a number of credible
rationales for this agreement: to earn trust and goodwill with
policymakers in Delhi, and the Indian public; to help accelerate the
development of a strategic partnership between our two countries; to
promote the use of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly
alternative to the use of coal and other scarce fossil fuels; and to
emulate an Eisenhower-style atoms-for-peace initiative.
Nevertheless, as strong as the case for this initiative may be, I
remain deeply concerned that the agreement negotiated by the
Administration fundamentally undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the linchpin of U.S.led international efforts to stem the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Administration officials assert that the exceptional treatment being
accorded to India is unique and un-replicable. Once an exception to
treaty law is made, however, the door is opened for a whole spectrum of
governments, including close friends and alliance partners, to come
forward to make comparable claims for special treatment--whether they
be Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Pakistan, and even
Taiwan.
If India were the only consideration, it would be a no-brainer to
support this agreement. Unfortunately, at issue is the rule of law as
it applies to us and others as well.
In particular a number of other countries, with whom we currently do
not have amicable relations, such as Iran and North Korea, can be
expected to similarly press the international community to recognize
their legitimacy as nuclear weapons states. And if we unilaterally
declare the right to ignore international law, other countries,
including nuclear weapon states, can not be expected to go along with
an exclusive American right to take exception to treaties.
This agreement thus creates opportunity for countries to use
commercial or geopolitical rationales to expand forms of nuclear
cooperation otherwise prohibited by existing international norms (such
as the NPT) or procedures (such as those developed by the multilateral
Nuclear Suppliers Group).
For example, in the immediate wake of the President's announcement of
a policy shift, before either the Congress or the multilateral NSG
could consider the proposal, Moscow moved to preempt Washington by
announcing it would provide New Delhi with uranium reactor fuel in
contravention of NSG guidelines.
In other words, the mere announcement of an Executive Branch-
initiated proposal has had the effect of undercutting the NPT and
precipitated another nation-state to implement key aspects of
Washington's initiative.
Similarly, the government of Pakistan announced it would be obligated
to match any expansion in India's nuclear weapons program.
The reason we have an NPT is to restrain nuclear weapons development.
Based on news reports this past week from Pakistan, it is clear that
one of the consequences of breaking international law is the
precipitation of an arms race on the Indian Subcontinent. But as
unfortunate as this arms race is, the consequence of the U.S.-led
unraveling of the NPT is the spiraling of nuclear weapons development
elsewhere.
Mr. Chairman, in a philosophical context this agreement is a
reflection of an Administration approach to foreign policy rooted in
the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do
not define as refining a shining city on a Hill but as the right of a
superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints
applied to others.
In the neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit
assumption in that American security can be bought and managed alone,
in many cases without allies, and without consideration of contrasting
international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties
like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower
has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen
the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.
Now the Administration proposes to weaken the NPT, perhaps fatally,
which despite its weaknesses has helped limit the number of nuclear
weapon states to a relative handful instead of 20 or 30 or even more.
As much as I support the Administration's desire to more rapidly
advance a warming of relations with India, I cannot in good conscience
support a weakening of the global nonproliferation regime or the
breaching of United States obligations under international law. I
therefore cannot support the legislation in its current form.

[[Page H5910]]

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic
leader, my friend and neighbor.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
California for yielding, for his tremendous leadership in making our
country strong and respected throughout the world.
I am pleased to join him in paying tribute to the chairman of the
committee, Henry Hyde. What a wonderful honor that this bill is named
for him. He, too, has been a champion to promote a values-based
diplomacy for our country. We have all fought many years with him in
support of human rights throughout the world. This is probably one of
the last bills that will be completed on issues that relate to national
security and the respect with which we are held in the world. So
appropriately, it is named for Mr. Hyde.
Both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos have presented the House with
legislation that is a vast improvement, frankly, over the bill that the
President requested earlier this year, and it is a tribute to their
leadership that we can all come together on this legislation this
evening.
The bill before us establishes a two-step process for the India
nuclear agreement. It is a process and legislation, which I support,
that allows Congress to reserve final judgment on the agreement until
the specifics are known. It requires that before Congress votes on the
agreement, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency will have
had to establish a process through which IAEA safeguards will be
applied forever to India's civilian nuclear facilities, programs and
materials.
Therefore, if an agreement is ultimately approved, Congress will
retain the ability to monitor it through the required annual reports on
U.S. nonproliferation policies in South Asia and on the implementation
of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

{time} 1830

This legislation is important because it recognizes that the prospect
of greater nuclear cooperation with a nation that has not signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty raises serious concerns. As one who
came to Congress intent on improving international nonproliferation
regimes, I appreciate those concerns. One of the most significant, the
issue of the production by India of fissile material, is addressed by
an amendment to be offered by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Berman).
The Berman amendment, which I support, conditions the provision of
nuclear fuel by the U.S. on a presidential determination that India has
halted fissile material production. But even if the Berman amendment is
not adopted, I hope that the agreement that will be presented to
Congress for approval when negotiations are concluded contains a
promise by India to halt the production of fissile material. Such a
promise would improve the agreement and go a long way to convincing
those who cannot support today's legislation that their concerns have
been heard and that the Bush administration and the government of India
has sought to respond to them.
The legislation before us clearly endorses the philosophy behind
India's nuclear initiative; a judgment that security would be promoted
by bringing India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. On
balance, I believe that judgment to be correct, and I thank you, Mr.
Lantos and Mr. Hyde, for putting that balance here.
Although not bound by the NPT, India has a strong record of
supporting nonproliferation goals. They have never ever violated the
NPT. India has demonstrated by its actions a commitment to safeguarding
nuclear technology. That commitment will be strengthened by India's
adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines as required by the nuclear
initiative.
A close relationship with the democratic India is critical for the
United States. There is a wide range of significant issues on which our
shared values and shared interests will enable productive collaboration
for the betterment of the world. This legislation reflects the strength
of our current relationship with India and our hopes for its future. It
is an expression of trust on matters relating to nuclear technology
based on 3 decades of experience.
I urge my colleagues to support it. Even though there may be some
questions and some amendments which may pass or not prevail today, on
balance, I believe this legislation as presented here is worthy of our
support.
I hope that the agreement that comes back to us is one that will be
without controversy and will again be a reflection of the close bond
between India and America. It was but a week ago when we were all
gathered here to extend our sympathy to the people and the government
of India because of the tragedy at Mumbai. Many of us expressed the
love that we have for India and appreciation for the gifts that India
has given to America, a vibrant dynamic Indo-American community which
has contributed enormously to the economic success of our country and
to our competitiveness in the world.
They have also contributed much to us in terms of our own social
justice. We owe much to India as the source of nonviolence as a
philosophy, espoused and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi. I said last week
that when Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and Coretta Scott King went
to India to study nonviolence, they received a gift from India that
would serve our country well and be important and fundamental to our
own civil rights movement; that nonviolence was a strength that again
improved America, and for which we all should be indebted to India and
we should never forget.
I also personally join Mr. Lantos, because I know of his history on
the subject in expressing appreciation to India for its hospitality to
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a great leader in the world. And I am
enormously appreciative of the fact that his, I don't want to call it
government in exile, but whatever the term of art is, in Darussalam in
India.
The list goes on and on, we can name them over and over, again
whether it is again the contributions of the Indo-American community,
the philosophy that sprang from India that is so important to us, or
the support for human rights. But on target for today is India's
commitment, which it has never violated, to support the principles of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which although it is not a party
to that treaty, has been a supporter of its principles.
Again, for that reason, I hope that all of our colleagues will vote
in support of this legislation so that we can go to the next step and
that we can go into the future continuing a long and beneficial
relationship with India for us all.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, before yielding time, I want to express my
regret to all of my colleagues that the stringent requirements will
enable me to yield no more than 1 minute to each of our speakers.
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to a distinguished
member of the committee, my good friend from California (Mr. Sherman).
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, India is a democracy that understands the
role of this Congress. They have negotiated a deal that dramatically
loosens the controls on their nuclear weapons program, and they know
that it is the role of this Congress to make that deal one step
tighter.
Our job is to protect the nonproliferation interests of the United
States. The job of India is to say that any amendment we offer is a
``killer amendment.'' Do not be fooled. They know and they expect that
this Congress will do its job and make this deal one step better when
it comes to controlling nuclear weapons.
India did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We should not
punish India for becoming a nuclear power, but this deal in its present
form facilitates building additional nuclear weapons by India. It will
allow them to build twice as many nuclear weapons per year as they are
doing now.
That is why I will be offering an amendment that will help India's
civilian nuclear program, without helping their military program.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Crowley).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman.

[[Page H5911]]

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to commend Chairman Hyde and
Ranking Member Lantos for the work they put into crafting this
bipartisan legislation that we have before us today. And I would like
to thank the current chairs of the caucus on India and Indian
Americans, Representative Gary Ackerman from Queens and my good friend
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida for the support they have given to the
passage of this agreement. I must also recognize the Indian-American
community for the incredible advocacy work they have done to educate
Members of Congress on the importance of this agreement.
I want it to be clear that this vote sets the stage for allowing the
cooperation, but the actual exchange of civilian nuclear cooperation
will not take place until Congress is provided with the details of the
relevant negotiations and takes a second up-or-down vote.
We will be taking an historic step in our relations today by passing
this agreement. This is about nuclear power access, not nuclear weapons
enhancement. By passing this agreement, we will be bringing an India
that has remained outside the nonproliferation regime for the past 32
years under the nonproliferation tent.
Some of my colleagues have argued we are destroying the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, also known as the NPT, by passing this
agreement. But while I have the deepest respect for the treaty and
those who support it, we must be realistic in understanding why this
deal needs to be done.
India cannot sign the NPT unless it were to give up its nuclear
weapons, which is unrealistic to ask a nation who finds themselves
surrounded by nuclear-armed nations they have fought wars against.
India has been punished for the past 32 years for testing a nuclear
weapon, and during these 32 years of NPT limbo they have not externally
proliferated, while remaining a true democracy with a strong rule of
law.
We need to use India as an example of what a nation should be doing
to gain the respect and inclusion by the international community. I
urge my colleagues to end India's nuclear isolation and allow them to
be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear
technology.
I support this legislation because I support the relationship that
our two countries should and will be sharing. If we expect India to be
our ally in the 21st century, we must treat them as an equal, which is
what this cooperation will provide. I trust my colleagues will
recognize what our future with India holds and vote for final passage
of this legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Meeks), our distinguished colleague.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I too want to congratulate
Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos for the strong bipartisan bill.
This initiative really talks about and reflects confidence in India
as a global strategic partner. You know, the world is flat, and we have
to have these partners in the world. What this does is, it says to
India, because it is one of the world's largest democracies, that we
understand and we recognize that.
Also, we have to remember that this is about civil nuclear power.
India has over a billion people and we have to figure out how we also
make sure that we protect and preserve our environment. So what this
does is recognize that the production of clean energy can reduce
further pollution of the environment and decrease dependency on fossil
fuels.
In fact, if you look at the Indian CO<INF>2</INF> emission, a
threefold increase in India nuclear capacity by 2015 would result in a
reduction of over 170 million tons annually, or approximately the total
current CO<INF>2</INF> emissions of the Netherlands. So I strongly
support this bill.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield the balance of
my time to my good friend from California, Congresswoman Barbara Lee.
The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Gutknecht). The gentlewoman from California
is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding and
for his leadership and for really crafting a bill that I think is much
better than what it was prior to the hearing, but I must rise to oppose
this bill.
I had the privilege to visit India a few years ago with Mr. Crowley,
and I witnessed firsthand the brilliance, the spirit, and the
commitment to democracy of the Indian people. And like many of my
colleagues, I strongly believe that it is in our country's best
interest to strengthen our relationship with India. But to suggest that
we can only do so at the expense of the international nonproliferation
standards, as this legislation before us would, I think that is both
dishonest and it is dangerous.
Let us be clear. This is not about India. As far as I am concerned,
there is no country, and I mean no country, for which it would be
acceptable to sacrifice our international standards. The problem with
the deal, as it is currently written, is that it will do lasting harm
to more than 30 years of international efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons.
This deal creates a double standard that undermines our efforts with
countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. It
creates incentives for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. Why have countries like Brazil and South Korea spent all these
years playing by the rules and not building nuclear weapons in exchange
for civilian technology when India gets both?
It sets a dangerous precedent. In explaining Beijing's rationale for
potentially pursuing a deal with Pakistan, Professor Shen Dingli of
China's Fudan University has already argued this. He said, ``If the
United States can violate the nuclear rules, then we can violate them
also.'' We should be fighting to save what is left of the international
nonproliferation framework, not just throwing it away.
We should insist that India formally commit to the goals and
restrictions on the international nonproliferation framework and sign
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Short of that, we should at least insist
on specific nonproliferation safeguards, as specified in an amendment
that I offered, which of course was not ruled in order. It would have
required, however, India to commit to the basic principles consistent
with the NPT. Again, unfortunately, this amendment was not made in
order.
We should not pass any type of a nuclear deal, a nuclear, quite
frankly business deal, without these safeguards. I don't think we
should throw them away. We need to go back to the drawing board and we
need to make sure that international nonproliferation goals are adhered
to.

{time} 1845

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, you know, while the United States is, in
fact, leading the way on this agreement, it is a multilateral agreement
in the sense that the NSG, 45 nations, must concur with this agreement;
and Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that the
administration is negotiating with India before technology is actually
transferred.
So I also want to make the point here that Congress is going to have
a second crack at this agreement when it comes back. But here is the
choice that we face: Either we continue to try to box in India and hope
for the best, or we make this move, we engage India, and we hope to use
our influence to move this increasingly important country in our
direction. And this will help make India a true partner, a true partner
as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle, I fear, against
Islamist terrorism.
This is not an ideal agreement, and the administration should be more
aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff. But
this agreement is a good one which works through a difficult
nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship for
us.
That is why I ask my colleagues to approve this legislation. Frankly,
it is a chance to strengthen an important relationship for us at a time
when we need more strong relationships, especially with regional powers
such as India; and, I will remind my colleagues, it strengthens a
relationship with a democracy, based on the rule of law, a democracy
that has a good record on nonproliferation.

[[Page H5912]]

This deal is controversial in India. The coalition government of
Prime Minister Singh has come under intense attack from the political
extremes and from political opponents. He has been charged with selling
out India, opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection,
agreeing to check India's nuclear weapons production.
So far the center has held. Let's not deliver India's Marxist and
xenophobic forces a victory. They would like us to kill this deal.
Let's pass this legislation. As Chairman Hyde argued and as the ranking
member explained, let's pass this legislation. Let the administration
negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement with India, and then look again
and decide whether or not to proceed.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act (H.R. 5682). The bill has substantially improved since it
was first introduced in this body, but it still has a long way to go. I
am particularly concerned about the failure of the bill to slow down a
potentially catastrophic arms race in South Asia.
This bill would allow the President to enter into a nuclear
cooperation agreement with India, the world's largest democracy and an
important strategic ally of the United States. Under the proposed
agreement, the United States would transfer fissile material and
nuclear technology to India in exchange for India's promise to separate
its civilian and military nuclear programs, subject its civilian
programs to a host of international inspections and controls, and
continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
As is an all too common habit of this administration, the key
parameters of this agreement were negotiated with little or no
congressional input. Congress was forced to add in protections against
proliferation of nuclear technology and to ensure nuclear safety
largely after the fact.
To this end, the House International Relations Committee has done an
outstanding job in reasserting Congress' constitutional prerogatives.
Thanks to the hard work of the Committee, the bill now requires that
the President report to Congress on the progress that India has taken
toward separating its civilian and military programs, toward placing
its civilian programs under international supervision, otherwise living
up to its end of the bargain. Congress then must vote to grant the
President the authority to enter into this agreement. I welcome these
improvements.
I also commend Congressman Howard Berman for his tireless efforts to
give arms control protections in the agreement some teeth. Mr. Berman
was instrumental in adding provisions that would automatically cease
U.S. transfers of fissile material if India transferred missile or
nuclear technology to third parties in violation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime or the Nuclear Suppliers Group regulations.
These provisions are vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear technology and
materials do not end up in the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.
But as far as this bill has come, it has not come far enough. The
bill still allows the President to transfer fissile material to India
without ensuring that India first cease its domestic production. It
would therefore allow India to use U.S.-provided uranium for its
civilian programs, while diverting all of its domestic production of
uranium to the development of nuclear weapons. If India chose to divert
its domestic material to its military programs, some commentators have
estimated that it could build an additional 50 nuclear weapons every
year.
This bill could thus fuel an already accelerating arms race in South
Asia. India and Pakistan have engaged in intermittent hostilities for
years, and both already have nuclear weapons. Adding hundreds of new
nuclear weapons to this equation will unacceptably increase the risk of
a nuclear exchange. Pakistan has already hinted that it would increase
its production of nuclear weapons if this agreement is approved. We
must do all in our power to stop this train while it is still in the
station.
I am sympathetic to India's needs for clean, affordable power. I also
recognize that India is a crucial ally of the United States. But we
cannot allow an arms race to spiral out of control.
Both India and the administration have time to allay these concerns
before Congress will hold its final vote on this agreement. I look
forward to reviewing the President's report, and will withhold final
judgment on this agreement until then.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5682, the
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
Were India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the
primary international tool for limiting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, I would gladly support the agreement. My district is home to a
large Indian-American population, whose opinions I value and whose
support I have long enjoyed. I regret having to disagree with many of
them today.
But I am--and have always been--an ardent proponent of nuclear
nonproliferation. I believe that the fewer nuclear weapons that exist
in the world, the better. Unfortunately, America's unilateral agreement
will encourage an arms race on the Indian subcontinent, promote weak
export controls around the world, and undermine the NPT.
This week, it was revealed that Pakistan is constructing a new
plutonium-production reactor that will massively increase its bomb-
making capacity. Rather than adding fuel to the fire by offering India
a deal that will allow and encourage it to also increase weapons
production, the United States should work to end the production of all
fissile material in South Asia.
A unilateral agreement with India could also undermine the
cohesiveness of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. If the United States
exempts India from nuclear nonproliferation controls, China would
likely feel it appropriate to make a similar agreement and export
civilian nuclear technology to Iran or North Korea.
I am aware that as part of the agreement, India has opted to allow
some of its reactors to be inspected. This concession, however, is
largely symbolic. The reactors that will continue to be off limits
could make more plutonium for weapons than India will ever need.
Furthermore, the precedent of working outside the NPT is dangerous. If
India can secure the benefits of NPT membership without adhering to the
treaty's limitations, other countries will have little incentive to
remain in the NPT.
I urge my colleagues to stand up for non-proliferation and join me in
voting ``no.''
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, having visited India following the
Southeast Asia tsunami, I am more convinced than ever of the benefits
of a stronger U.S.-India partnership. There is no relationship more
important than that between the world's largest democracy, India, and
the world's oldest democracy, the United States. I believe that, as the
world's largest democracy and a responsible regional power, India
deserves a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Support for such
an arrangement would have been a sensible centerpiece to a new
strategic partnership.
However, I am skeptical about elements of the proposed nuclear
cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. I am particularly
concerned that this attempt to create an exception to international
nonproliferation norms for India may make our efforts in Iran more
difficult, or even encourage other countries to make their own
exceptions to the rules for assistance to the supposedly civilian
nuclear programs of less responsible countries.
I am pleased that the legislation crafted by the leadership of our
House International Relations Committee minimizes the risks associated
with this agreement and provides for close congressional oversight,
though I support additional amendments to strengthen it. I do not wish
to stand in the way of this legislation's progress and intend to follow
developments closely for the up-or-down vote that this bill authorizes.
I believe that the more pressing issue is developing an effective
strategy for cooperation to address India's growing energy needs.
Increased reliance on nuclear energy will only have a marginal impact
on India's consumption of fossil fuels and levels of global warming
pollution emitted. To make an immediate impact, we should be helping
India with conservation, renewable energy technologies, and strategies
to reduce pollution such as coal gasification.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S.
and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
India is the largest democracy in the world today, and is rightly
viewed as an emerging global power in the 21st century. I was pleased
to listen to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh address a Joint
Session of Congress in July 2005 and describe his vision of future
cooperation between India and the United States. I will continue to
encourage our government to strengthen our ties to India, in areas such
as high-technology, immigration, trade, space, and the military.
Today the United States and India can take an important step to lay
the foundation for our countries to greatly expand nuclear research,
nuclear power, and nonproliferation cooperation with each other. India
is facing enormous challenges in providing sufficient energy to its
growing population. India has more people living in abject poverty than
do Latin America and Africa combined.
This legislation establishes a two-step process under which the
United States may enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with
India. I am pleased that the Committee on International Relations has
significantly amended this legislation, as compared to the version
initially proposed by the Administration. The legislation today
preserves the important oversight role of Congress. Under this

[[Page H5913]]

legislation, the President must make a number of determinations before
India can be exempted from restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (AEA). Most notably, the President must determine that
India has provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear programs, and
that India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the
permanent application of IAEA safeguards to India's civil nuclear
facilities.
Once the President has made the determinations required by this
legislation, Congress must approve a joint resolution to ratify the
final negotiated text of a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. I
also support the provision in the bill that requires additional
consultation between the Administration and Congress, including regular
detailed reports on nonproliferation matters and the implementation of
this agreement.
I look forward to working with the Administration to implement this
nuclear cooperation program between the United States and India,
consistent with this legislation and the intent of Congress.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose H.R. 5682. I do this
reluctantly, because I am a strong supporter of India. But I cannot
turn my back on my life's work on nuclear non-proliferation.
Prior to coming to Congress, I worked at the U.S. Department of State
as an arms control expert. I spent each day there trying to reduce the
threat our nation faced from proliferation of nuclear weapons. I also
learned first hand how effectively the international non-proliferation
regime monitors existing nuclear states and prevents sensitive nuclear
technology from falling into the wrong hands. I also worked for 10
years at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to research and
develop fusion energy, because it would be an abundant source of energy
that would not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I am also a lifelong supporter of India. In fact, I first traveled to
India more than 30 years ago. When I came to Congress, the first caucus
I joined was the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans.
Since then, my interest in India and my respect for its citizens have
only grown. That is why I believe it is essential that our nation
increase its cooperation with India.
India is our friend and a strong ally. The ties that bind our nations
go to the core of our democratic values. India is the world's largest
democracy, she possesses a vibrant economy, and she has an unwavering
commitment to ending terrorism. America is fortunate to have an ally
that shares our common vision and we need to grow our relationship by
increasing cooperation on other economic, educational, and security
concerns. But I have strong reservations about making individual
exceptions in our nation's laws for nuclear export to India or any
other state.
The non-proliferation regime we have is far from perfect, but it has
proven to be remarkably successful in deterring the spread of nuclear
material. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 is the
centerpiece of international nuclear nonproliferation structure. The
NPT ensured that today we are dealing with only a handful of
problematic states, such as Iran, rather than the dozens of nuclear
states that might have existed otherwise. These historical successes
highlight the essential role that the international non-proliferation
regime has played and why it must not be undermined.
The United States was instrumental in creating the NPT, and now is
not the time to stop our leadership on this important issue. The United
States should not send the wrong message to the global community. We
must continue to be a leader on nuclear non-proliferation if we hope to
prevent Iran, North Korea, or others from acquiring nuclear weapons.

During the 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and
Senator Kerry agreed on one thing: nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism are the gravest threat that our country faces. The threat of
nuclear terrorism is underscored today because of the recent actions of
Iran and the continued work by North Korea to develop nuclear
technology.
That is why we need to be doing more to strengthen and support the
international nuclear non-proliferation structure, not weaken it. Some
non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that this bill would
violate Article I of the NPT. Additionally this bill would create an
exception to the rule, and thereby create a new rule.
I have been impressed by India and I do believe that she has been one
of the most responsible nuclear states in the world. And unlike her
neighbor, India has not engaged in wholesale proliferation of nuclear
technology.
The bill before us today would make changes to the Atomic Energy Act
which would allow for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and
material to India. This would be the first time the conditions for
nuclear cooperation in the Act were changed for an individual state. We
should not make these changes lightly. We need to understand the
implications of what we are doing for the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.
As well, we must also be clear. This is not the final vote the House
will take on this important issue. Under the provisions contained in
this bill, Congress will again have to review and vote to support
nuclear cooperation once the final text of the cooperation agreement is
finalized. For that reason, I remain unsure why Congress is considering
or approving these significant changes to our nuclear non-proliferation
structure. The Nuclear Suppliers Group still needs to give its approval
to this proposed nuclear cooperation agreement. As well, India needs to
complete its negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency
on a new safeguards agreement. These are not just minor points, not
just iotas in the agreement. They are central to the issue. What would
be wrong with waiting for the final text to be negotiated and these
important steps to be taken before we change our nation's laws to allow
for nuclear material transfer?
That said, I remain troubled that providing nuclear technology to
India would create a double standard. Historically, the United States
has only provided nuclear technology to states that are parties to the
NPT. This bill would allow for cooperation with India, despite the fact
the India has not signed or ratified the NPT, and had previously
developed a secret nuclear weapons program.
Additionally, I am worried that this legislation does not require
India to cap or even limit its fissile material production. The United
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France have all publicly
announced that they are no longer producing fissile material for
military use. Even China is believed to have stopped producing fissile
material. Without a requirement to limit fissile material production,
the United States is tacitly endorsing further production. We should
not help any state in the world increase its stockpile of nuclear
weapons, especially at a time when we are reducing our own stockpile.
I am also concerned that this legislation does not require that all
of India's nuclear reactors be placed under international safeguards.
That means that some of India's reactors will be used for military
purposes and kept outside safeguards and the nonproliferation regime.
The whole purpose of safeguards is to ensure that fissile material is
not diverted to build nuclear weapons secretly. We need full scope
safeguards on all of India's reactors to ensure that U.S. technology or
nuclear material is not being diverted for military purposes. In
effect, we would be giving approval to the existence of undeclared,
uninspected production of fissile material.
Further, India is not required to classify her new reactors as
civilian rather than military. Some have argued that nuclear
cooperation is needed to help meet India's growing energy needs. If
that is the case then every single new reactor should be civilian
energy producing facilities. We should be doing more to discourage
India from expanding her military nuclear program, rather than making
it easier.
This bill makes some improvements on the legislation that the
Administration submitted, and I am glad that some of my colleagues who
share my concerns tried to improve it. Yet, even with these changes I
do not think it wise to shred one of the few nonproliferation
instruments we have. I am sorry that before they came to us the
Administration did not negotiate a better agreement which would not
jeopardize decades of nonproliferation work. I am also sorry we have
not approached this matter to obtain the active partnership of such a
respected and important country as India in the effort to prevent
nuclear proliferation around the world. India teamed with us and other
countries could be a most influential leader in reducing the threat of
nuclear weapons around the world. I remain convinced that nuclear
cooperation could be achieved with India, however this is not the
proper way to do so.
For these reasons, I cannot support this bill which would undermine
the NPT and our nation's long history of nuclear nonproliferation. I
would oppose this deal if it was with any country outside of the NPT
because I would have the same concerns. But I also know that despite my
vote on this bill it will be approved by wide margins. I hope I am
proven wrong, that this bill will not undermine our nation's
nonproliferation efforts, but I regret that I cannot see how that can
be.
Mr. JINDAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in support of H.R. 5682,
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
The bill would facilitate the sharing of civilian nuclear technology in
an attempt to decrease competition for scarce energy resources and
strengthen relations between the two nations.
With the receding of the global divisions established during the Cold
War era, there has been increasing recognition that significant
benefits can be obtained from closer cooperation between the U.S. and
India. H.R. 5682 reflects broad agreement that peaceful nuclear
cooperation with India can serve U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives and also minimize potential risks to the
nonproliferation regime. This ranges from shared

[[Page H5914]]

strategic interests, such as enhanced stability and security in South
Asia and the international system as a whole, to more specific
priorities, such as combating global terrorism.
Today, the chief threat to our security and the security of our
allies worldwide is posed by violent acts of terrorism by extremists
and rogue nations engaged in nuclear experimentation to the detriment
of the principles of freedom worldwide. As we witnessed recently by the
bombing of Mumbai's subway system earlier this month, global terrorism
is a threat that India shares with the United States. We need India's
ongoing partnership in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, by
engaging in this agreement with India, we are able to strengthen the
international nonproliferation regime by placing a majority of India's
nuclear plants under international inspection. This is a more practical
and realistic shift in U.S. nuclear policy that should be viewed as a
victory for nonproliferation advocates compared to our previous policy
of forced abandonment which yielded little towards achieving greater
international security.
For our own sake, if for no other reason, it is imperative that we
help countries like India and China curb their increasing consumption
of oil and natural gas for domestic and commercial use. This, in turn,
will help us curtail the cost of oil and natural gas, while helping
India develop its own nuclear power sources sufficient to meet their
growing demand. The result is that prices worldwide will decrease as
overall supply of oil and natural gas increase, thus helping our own
economy by preserving many of the industries that have been forced to
close their doors because of high production costs.
Our relationship with India is unique--the United States and India
are the oldest and largest democracies in the world. While we cannot
foresee that China will share common political principles in the near
future, because India's history is rooted in Democracy they are an
ideal partner for achieving our goals of creating international and
economic security. Passing H.R. 5682 is an important step toward
cementing the great strides we have made in the past year in
establishing this strategic partnership.
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of
H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act.
India is a strategic friend and ally of the United States. Indian
Americans have made an indelible mark upon the culture and diversity of
our nation and I was proud to sponsor H. Res. 227 that recognized the
contributions of Indian Americans to our nation, which the House passed
earlier this year.
India and the United States have a strong history of cooperation.
Directly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, India was one
of the first countries to offer immediate aid to the United States. As
the two largest pluralistic, free-market democracies in the world, it
is only natural for the United States and India to seek to strengthen
our bilateral relationship.
Last July, President Bush and Prime Minister Sing issued a Joint
Statement declaring a new era of respect, reciprocity and cooperation,
spanning the fields of high technology, space exploration, counter-
terrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
This legislation lays the statutory foundation to expand nuclear
research, nuclear power and nonproliferation cooperation with India
that would allow full trade in civil nuclear energy. In exchange for
such trade, India has agreed to separate its military and civilian
nuclear programs over the next eight years, placing 14 of its 22
reactors under permanent international safeguards, as well as all
future civilian thermal and breeder reactors. It has also agreed to
maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and to work with
the United States toward a fissile material cutoff treaty.
Mr. Chairman, the United States should seize this opportunity to
forge a strategic alliance with India to expand civil nuclear energy
production in that country. In closing, I thank the leadership for
allowing this legislation to come to the floor today and urge an aye
vote.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. With
the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities
of globalization and trans-national terrorism, for more than a decade
there has been increasing recognition in both countries of the
significant benefits to be obtained from closer cooperation across a
broad spectrum. To that end, on July 15, 2005 President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement announcing a ``global
partnership'' between the two countries that embraces cooperation
across a wide range of subjects.
I am in support of this bill because this legislation reflects broad
agreement consensus among Members of Congress that peaceful nuclear
cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy
objectives, but must be approached in a manner that minimizes potential
risks to the nonproliferation regime. Among the most important
considerations are ensuring that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld and that a U.S.
nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent U.S. nuclear exports are
consistent with decisions, policies, and guidelines of the NSG. Equally
important is the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation does not assist
the Indian nuclear weapons program directly, or indirectly, in order to
avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and because of
U.S. obligations under the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
There are two other noteworthy provisions in this bill which I
consider very crucial in the United States' relationship with India
regarding nuclear weapons. The bill contains reporting requirements and
a provision that calls for termination of exports in the event of
violations of certain commitments and seeks to uphold existing
statutory Congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear cooperation and
exports. At a time when the world appears to be considering nuclear
energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-based energy
sources, oversight of its expansion is crucial.
The President took a bold step by cutting a deal with India on
nuclear cooperation and it is now up to Congress to make the necessary
fixes without undermining the deal. India has proven itself deserving
of an understanding of cooperation with the United States regarding
nuclear weapons. India has been punished for the last thirty-two years,
but over that time they have shown a responsible foreign policy, and a
commitment to democracy and rule of law. This deal would also provide
India with some of its energy needs to continue to grow her economy and
lower the use of coal burning power plants.
We cannot forget about our Indian American citizens during our talks
of a nuclear cooperation with India. There are about two million Indian
Americans living in the United States and the majority of them support
this nuclear deal. We must let the Indian American community know that
we hear them, we stand with them, and are both working towards the
mutual goals of democracy. This deal will strengthen our long term
relationship with India in hopes that they will continue to be one of
our strongest allies in the War on Terrorism. This agreement will
benefit the United States as well as India in monitoring nuclear
weapons in helping to stabilize our world's economy and safety and I
urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I will be introducing an amendment that urges Congress to continue
its policies of engagement, collaborations, and exchanges with India
and Pakistan. My bipartisan amendment is consistent with many U.S.
foreign policy objectives. It will also draw the United States closer
to this vitally important and strategic democracy.
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I support the legislation before the
House of Representatives today, H.R. 5682, the United States and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. A civil nuclear cooperation
agreement will make citizens of America and India more safe and secure,
while providing increased stability around the world.
Since coming to Congress, I have felt that it is appropriate for the
United States and India to have a close relationship. Last year, when
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced that the two
countries would seek cooperation on its civil nuclear programs, I was
immediately encouraged and supportive of their efforts. The improved
relations stemming from this agreement will lead to untold benefits for
the American and Indian people and enhance our mutual interests.
The U.S.-India relationship is strong and growing stronger because of
our shared principles and goals. We remain the two largest democracies
in the world, committed to political freedom protected by a
representative government, and we share a commitment to free-market
principles. These principles--bolstered by one of the world's largest
consumer markets and a growing skilled labor force--have helped India
in its development into a global economic power.
However, that growing economy depends on energy. Nuclear energy,
unlike other energy sources, is truly a ``green'' energy source. It
does not emit any carbon dioxide emissions or greenhouse gases. It also
requires less geographic area to produce energy than other energy
sources. Nuclear power is under-utilized and we should promote, not
hamper, its growth.
Since the establishment of the Indian nuclear program in 1974, there
has been no international oversight of India's nuclear program. A
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement will provide India with much of
the energy it needs while also bringing their civilian nuclear program
under international review. With this agreement, the majority of
India's civilian program will be under supervision of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
We always must be mindful of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
materials falling into the

[[Page H5915]]

wrong hands. The Indian government remains committed to peace and
stability in the region and the world and they realize the danger of
allowing the proliferation of nuclear technology and material.
Sadly, this danger is all too real to the people of India because--
like the U.S.--India has not been immune to terror attacks. The train
bombing earlier this month and the attack on their parliament 5 years
ago remains a constant reminder of terror and has forced them to
reevaluate their civilian nuclear program and their status in the
international community.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5682 will strengthen the U.S.-India relationship,
promote a clean energy source, and make global nuclear materials more
secure. For all these reasons, I strongly support the bill and
encourage my colleagues to do so as well.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 5682, the
U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act. At a time when world
energy reserves and production are just barely keeping up with current
capacity, I believe that this bill is the right policy for both our
countries.
India is currently the sixth largest energy consumer in the world and
continues to grow exponentially in its population. With only 3 percent
of India's energy consumption being derived from nuclear energy, it is
depending heavily on foreign energy sources. By helping India with its
civilian nuclear power industry, and thereby reducing its dependency on
other fuel sources, Americans ultimately should experience lower energy
costs as available fuel sources increase.
This bill also will further strengthen India's commitment to nuclear
nonproliferation. India has committed to following International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards, allowing for additional inspections, and has
produced a plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear
facilities.
In this uncertain world, and with India in the middle of a volatile
region, it is imperative that the world's largest democracy have access
to a constant and inexpensive source of energy. Mr. Chairman, I believe
this legislation will help solidify our ongoing and deepening
relationship with our friends in India and I urge all of my colleagues
to support it.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, there will be a time when the history of the
spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction is written and we will
look back and see when the last thread of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime was shredded. We can all talk at length about the details of
this cooperative agreement. We can talk about what a good friend India
is and how responsible they have been. We can talk about the so-called
reality of an imperfect ability to control the militarization of
nuclear reactions. But the history will say that with this agreement
the world lost the last bit of an international tool to control the
spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The regime will have
been killed. All we will have left is our ability to jawbone with our
allies and threaten our enemies. Countries will work out whatever deals
they can, two by two. This is a very dangerous moment.
If we really believe that nuclear proliferation and loose nukes are
the greatest threat to world peace and security, as I do, then we
should be holding on to every tool we can find to prevent that threat.
We should also be working with India to strengthen the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, not collaborating with India to destroy it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Gutknecht). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in part A of
House Report 109-599, is adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be
considered as an original bill for the purpose of further amendment
under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 5682

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``United States and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and
the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United
States foreign policy;
(2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its
implementation, particularly its verification and compliance,
is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing
the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and
maintaining a stable international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and
remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential
challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global
nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken
the NPT's international obligation to prohibit the spread of
dangerous nuclear technologies;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the
fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that
are not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear
technology they develop;
(6) it may be in the interest of the United States to enter
into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as set forth in
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)
with a country that has never been an NPT member with respect
to civilian nuclear technology if--
(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with
respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to
weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver
them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is
congruent to that of the United States, and is working with
the United States in key foreign policy initiatives related
to non-proliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to implement the
highest possible protections against the proliferation of
technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs
and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions
that would further the development of its nuclear weapons
program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give
greater political and material support to the achievement of
United States global and regional nonproliferation
objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating,
and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that
sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, that are seeking to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass
destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
and
(7)(A) India meets the criteria described in this
subsection; and
(B) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to deepen its relationship with India across a full
range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

(a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the
United States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or
outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
(2) Encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the
right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes'', as described in Article IV of
the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by
the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by
refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party
that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with
its NPT obligations, as determined by the IAEA.
(3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines
concerning consultation by members regarding violations of
supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the
practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members
to all such violations, including termination of nuclear
transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages
individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such
recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a
coordinated response has been achieved.
(b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile
material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan,
and the People's Republic of China at the earliest possible
date.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion
and implementation of a treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United
States and India become parties.
(3) Secure India's--
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures,
Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement;
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna
on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India's full and active participation in United
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary,
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability
(including the capability to enrich or process nuclear
materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in
South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual
elimination.
(6) To ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian
nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United
States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures
required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 f.).

[[Page H5916]]

(7) Pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium,
encourage India not to increase its production of fissile
material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, if the President makes the determination described in
subsection (b), the President may--
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation
with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in
section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for
cooperation may only enter into force in accordance with
subsection (f);
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India,
provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if the
President determines that India has engaged in any activity
described section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other
than section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such
Act, at any time after the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(3) with respect to India--
(A) waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any
activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005; and
(B) section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act.
(b) Determination by the President.--The determination
referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the
President that the following actions have occurred:
(1) India has provided the United States and the
International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to
separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials,
and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil
facilities with the IAEA.
(2) India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement
requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in
accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices
(including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973))
to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs
as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including
materials used in or produced through the use of India's
civil nuclear facilities.
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress
toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA
principles, practices, and policies that would apply to
India's civil nuclear program.
(4) India is working actively with the United States for
the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty.
(5) India is working with and supporting United States and
international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technology.
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear
and other sensitive materials and technology, including
through--
(A) the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive export
control legislation and regulations;
(B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations,
policies, and practices with the policies and practices of
the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group; and
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with
the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to
India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG
and such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with
any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere.
(c) Submission to Congress.--
(1) In general.--The President shall submit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate information concerning any determination made pursuant
to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis
for the determination.
(2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent
available to the United States, the information referred to
in paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United
States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military
nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the
declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's
civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards,
including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and
declaration, together with copies of the plan and
declaration.
(B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into
between India and the IAEA requiring the application of
safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil
nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in
subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and
a description of the progress toward its full implementation.
(C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and
implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and
the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such
Additional Protocol.
(D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work
with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons, including a description of the steps that the United
States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify
and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or
treaty.
(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent
the spread of nuclear-related technology, including
enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can
be used to acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well as
the support that India is providing to the United States to
further United States objectives to restrict the spread of
such technology.
(F) A description of the steps that India is taking to
secure materials and technology applicable for the
development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the
application of comprehensive export control legislation and
regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, and United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
(G) A description of the decision taken within the Nuclear
Suppliers Group relating to nuclear cooperation with India,
including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States
under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)
is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of
the NSG.
(H) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation
envisioned by the United States and India that will be
implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,
including whether such cooperation will include the provision
of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
(I) A description of the steps taken to ensure that
proposed United States civil nuclear assistance to India will
not directly, or in any other way, assist India's nuclear
weapons program, including--
(i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or
nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear
facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United
States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or
unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any
activity related to the research, development, testing, or
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to
facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched
uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers to India.--
(1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United
States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this Act, or
any agreement pursuant to this Act, shall be interpreted as
permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United
States and India that would in any way assist, encourage, or
induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
(2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry
into force of an agreement for cooperation with India
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item
subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer
guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such
transfer would violate the transfer guidelines of the NSG as
in effect on the date of the transfer.
(3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for
nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)),
exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment,
or technology to India shall be terminated if India makes any
materially significant transfer of--
(A) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or
technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines, or
(B) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or
technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines,

unless the President determines that cessation of such
exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security.
(4) Prohibition on nuclear transfers to india.--If nuclear
transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act,
the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of
nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other
participating governments in the NSG or from any other
source.
(e) Approval of Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation
Required.--
(1) In general.--Subject to subsection (h), an agreement
for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India
submitted pursuant to this section may become effective only
if--
(A) the President submits to Congress the agreement
concluded between the United States and India, including a
copy of the safeguards agreement entered into between the
IAEA and India relating to India's declared civilian nuclear
facilities, in accordance with the requirements and
procedures of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(other than section 123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act; and
(B) after the submission under subparagraph (A), the
agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is enacted
into law.
(2) Consultation.--Beginning one month after the date of
the enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until
the President submits to Congress the agreement referred to
in paragraph (1), the President should consult with the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate regarding the status of the negotiations between the
United States and India with respect to civilian nuclear
cooperation and between the

[[Page H5917]]

IAEA and India with respect to the safeguards agreement
described in subsection (b)(2).
(f) Joint Resolution of Approval.--For purposes of this
section, a joint resolution referred to in subsection
(e)(1)(B) is a joint resolution of the two Houses of
Congress--
(1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That the Congress hereby approves the Agreement
for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America
and the Republic of India submitted by the President on

---

appropriate date;
(2) which does not have a preamble; and
(3) the title of which is as follows: ``Joint Resolution
Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the
United States and India''.
(g) Consideration of Joint Resolution of Approval.--The
provisions of paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 130 i. of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 i.) shall apply
to a joint resolution under subsection (f) of this section to
the same extent as such provisions apply to a joint
resolution under section 130 i. of such Act. No amendment to,
or motion to recommit, a joint resolution under subsection
(f) of this section is in order.
(h) Section 123 of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Not
Affected.--Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this section
does not preclude the approval, under section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of an agreement
for cooperation in which India is the cooperating party.
(i) Sunset.--The procedures under this section shall cease
to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution
under this section.
(j) Reports.--
(1) Policy objectives.--The President shall, not later than
January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each year
thereafter, submit to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on--
(A) the extent to which each policy objective in section
3(b) has been achieved;
(B) the steps taken by the United States and India in the
preceding calendar year to accomplish those objectives;
(C) the extent of cooperation by other countries in
achieving those objectives; and
(D) the steps the United States will take in the current
calendar year to accomplish those objectives.
(2) Nuclear exports to india.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on
which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United
States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f)
and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report describing United States exports to India for
the preceding year pursuant to such agreement and the
anticipated exports to India for the next year pursuant to
such agreement.
(B) Nuclear fuel.--The report described in subparagraph (A)
shall also include (in a classified form if necessary)--
(i) an estimate for the previous year of the amount of
uranium mined in India;
(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used
or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices;
(iii) the rate of production of--

(I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
(II) nuclear explosive devices; and

(iv) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has
affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive
devices.
(C) Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.--The report described
in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified form
if necessary) a description of whether United States civil
nuclear assistance to India is directly, or in any other way,
assisting India's nuclear weapons program, including--
(i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or
nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear
facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United
States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or
unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any
activity related to the research, development, testing, or
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to
facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched
uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(3) New nuclear reactors or facilities.--Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
describing any new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities
that the Government of India has designated as civilian and
placed under inspections or has designated as military.
(4) Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.--Not later than one
year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India is approved
by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the
President shall submit to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear
program.
(k) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(2) MTCR.--The term ``MTCR'' means the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
(3) NPT.--The term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(4) NPT member.--The term ``NPT member'' means a country
that is a party to the NPT.
(5) NSG.--The term ``NSG'' means the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. No further amendment is in order except those
printed in part B of the report. Each amendment may be offered only in
the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report,
shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in
the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an
opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject
to a demand for division of the question.

Preferential Motion Offered by Mr. Obey

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I have a preferential motion at the desk.
The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. OBEY moves that the Committee do now rise and report
the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the
enacting clause be stricken.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that this legislation is
before us this afternoon. In my view, this is a badly conceived and
most especially a badly timed action which will weaken the
nonproliferation regime over the long haul and, in the end, wind up
encouraging the production of more nuclear weapons by Pakistan, China
and India.
It also is, in my view, spectacularly badly timed because it will
give Iran a greater excuse, as if they needed any, but it will give
Iran a greater excuse than they now have to continue to proceed with
their own nuclear program. I believe it is a profound mistake.
I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, we are being told that we shouldn't worry,
that this won't lead to a nuclear arms race.
Now, India is not a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
This agreement is in violation of the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 here
in Congress. All of their facilities are not being put under full-scope
safeguards.
Experts say that when we supply the nuclear fuel for their civilian
program, it is going to free up nuclear fuel for their nuclear weapons
program. It makes sense. But we are told, don't worry.
Now, right now, India makes about seven nuclear bombs a year, on
average. That is the magnitude. That is the scope of their program. But
experts say it will free up 40 to 50 bombs' worth of nuclear material
if they wanted to build more nuclear bombs. We are told, don't worry.
But here is what else is going on. This week in the world, A.Q. Khan,
under house arrest in Islamabad, this nuclear merchant that should be
on trial in the world court for what he has done in spreading nuclear
weapons materials around the world but yet the Bush administration has
turned a blind eye to him and allowed Musharraf just to keep him under
house arrest in a palace. Well, A.Q. Khan and his people now have a new
program, it turns out, on the front page of the Washington Post this
week, that will make it possible for them to build 40 to 50 plutonium
nuclear bombs per year. Now they are going to do it. They are going to
do it because they only have two to three nuclear bombs capacity per
day right now, and they can scale up to 40 to 50.
Now what is interesting about these two charts about India and
Pakistan, they are each now going to be capable of going from between
two and seven up to 40 to 50.
We are told, don't worry. Well, I am worrying; and I think we should
all worry. The Bush administration has not made public at all the fact
that they have known for at least 2 years that Pakistan has this
clandestine plutonium nuclear bomb program. It is the place where we
should all be concerned that that al Qaeda operative buys a nuclear
bomb and moves it into the Middle East, moves it to New York City,
moves it to Washington, D.C. And instead we are told, don't worry.
Well, what kind of signal are we sending to the world when Iran,
which is a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, is on trial
at the Security Council to comply with the nonproliferation treaty
because they are violating it, and we are turning a blind eye to what
India and Pakistan, nonsignatories to the nonproliferation

[[Page H5918]]

treaty, are doing or will do if this deal goes through? We will make a
mockery of the nonproliferation regime in the world.
And we know that President Bush doesn't care about it. Otherwise, we
would know more about this Pakistani program which they have had
satellite evidence of its existence for the last 2 years. We know that
he doesn't care about it. Otherwise, he would be forcing India to put
the full nuclear program in India under safeguards. He would be
extracting a ban on the production of fissile material in India, in the
same way that the United States and Russia and China and England and
France now don't produce any more fissile material.
But, no, the President is allowing an exemption. This deal is like
throwing a tinder onto an already raging fire in the most dangerous
part of the world and pretending that there is no relationship between
what we do here today and the response of Pakistan and Iran and other
nations around the world.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the motion.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I would make several points.
One, in terms of the program that is being laid out in the Washington
Post, I think it was this Monday, explaining Pakistan's ambitions with
respect to its nuclear buildup, that is clearly not something that can
be characterized as a reaction to this new initiative with India. The
reason I say that is because a careful reading of that Washington Post
report shows that the construction of this very facility site began in
the year 2000. The construction of the facility began 6 years ago.
I will also point out that the supposition that it could be used for
40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year, the information we have is that is
probably two or three. Yet the very existence of the facility itself
shows why a fissile cutoff is, frankly, not practical to enforce, to
attempt to enforce on India, except through negotiation.
And I think, lastly, in conclusion, the attempt to equate Pakistan's
efforts, now 6 years old, and tie that and say that that is in response
to a deal that we are negotiating with India of less than a year old is
clearly not germane to the argument that we have before us today.
So I oppose the motion of the gentleman from Wisconsin.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the preferential motion
offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
The preferential motion was rejected.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Royce

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of Mr. Hyde, I offer the
Hyde-Lantos amendment which is made in order by the rule.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Royce:
Page 3, line 12, strike ``may be'' and insert ``is''.
Page 4, beginning line 21, strike ``this subsection'' and
insert ``paragraph (6)''.
Page 11, line 3, strike ``and'' and all that follows
through line 8 and insert a period.
Page 15, line 22, insert ``nuclear'' before
``cooperation''.
Page 16, line 3, after ``violate'' insert ``or be
inconsistent with''.
Page 16, beginning line 6, strike ``Notwithstanding the
entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with
India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153))'' and insert ``Notwithstanding
the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation
with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act''.
Page 17, line 8, strike ``Subject to subsection (m), an''
and insert ``An''.

Modification to Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Royce

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the Hyde-Lantos
amendment made in order by the rule be modified in the form which I
have caused to be placed at the desk.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Royce:
Page 2, line 4, strike ``United States'' and insert ``Henry
J. Hyde United States''.
Page 3, line 12, strike ``may be'' and insert ``is''.
Page 4, beginning line 21, strike ``this subsection'' and
insert ``paragraph (6)''.
Page 11, line 3, strike ``and'' and all that follows
through line 8 and insert a period.
Page 15, line 22, insert ``nuclear'' before
``cooperation''.
Page 16, line 3, after ``violate'' insert ``or be
inconsistent with''.
Page 16, beginning line 6, strike ``Notwithstanding the
entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with
India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153))'' and insert ``Notwithstanding
the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation
with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act''.
Page 17, line 8, strike ``Subject to subsection (m), an''
and insert ``An''.

Mr. ROYCE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the modification be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I object.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
The Clerk will continue reading.
The Clerk continued to read.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my
objection.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the reading is dispensed
with.
There was no objection.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
There was no objection.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Royce) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, the only change in this amendment is to name
this bill after our distinguished chairman, Henry Hyde. The underlying
amendment contains a series of technical and conforming changes which
were needed to ensure the bill was properly drafted.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support naming this historic
legislation after our distinguished chairman as a small token of our
respect and appreciation for his enormous contributions to the national
security of the United States and to the sound conduct of U.S. foreign
policy.

{time} 1900

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
If all that the manager's amendment included was the naming of this
legislation after Henry Hyde, then I would be at the front of the line
to ensure that I would be praising him to the heavens. And I want the
gentleman from Illinois to understand that because he does deserve all
the accolades which he is receiving.
But there is just a little bit more in this manager's amendment than
naming it after the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.
The reason that I am opposed to this amendment is that it would
strike part of one of the seven conditions being placed on the India
nuclear deal.
Here is the full language of the condition. It is No. 7: ``The
Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to permit supply to
India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG and such
decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-
nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA,'' International Atomic
Energy Agency, ``safeguards on all nuclear materials within its
territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere.''
The manager's amendment would strike the words ``and such decision
does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-nuclear
weapon state that does not have International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.'' The impact
of that change in the language is that it would free the

[[Page H5919]]

Nuclear Suppliers Group to also allow nuclear commerce with other
nations that have not agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards on their
nuclear facilities, such as Pakistan.
I see absolutely no justification for opening the door to China to
come into the Nuclear Suppliers Group with a proposal to give Pakistan
the same deal that the administration is proposing to give India. That
is a bad idea. It invites a further weakening of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime and an expansion of commerce with
countries that do not allow full-scope international safeguards. We
should be very careful here. We should be very cautious.
The ostensible justification for the initiation of the war in Iraq is
that we did not want the next terrorist attack to come in the form of a
mushroom cloud. As we make these changes, they seem slight. They are
not. They are historic in terms of the safeguards that we have in place
to ensure that we are securing these nuclear materials, that proper
procedures are in place to make sure that countries and subnational
groups that should not have them in their possession are denied them.
This is a weakening amendment, and I urge the Members to oppose it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
It is my understanding that a member of the committee, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Sherman) offered an amendment in committee that
was passed on voice vote. However, upon further reflection, I
understand the Member has asked that the amendment language be removed.
And what is happening here is that the committee is honoring that
request. I would note, however, that the heart of the section 4(b)(7),
and this is the section that the gentleman is concerned about, which
states that the President must determine that the Nuclear Suppliers
Group has decided by consensus, that remains intact, and that is the
practice at the NSG.
And let me just quote from the bill: ``The NSG has decided by
consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the
guidelines of the NSG.''
So the heart of the determination remains intact. And, again, the
removal of that particular language was at the request of a member of
the committee, Mr. Sherman of California, who offered the original
amendment that was accepted in committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified,
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stearns

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Stearns:
In section 2(6)(D), strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
In section 2(7)(B), strike the period at the end and insert
``; and''.
In section 2, add at the end the following new paragraph:
(8) the United States Government, pursuant to the
restrictions in this Act, shall not participate in, or
contribute to, the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Stearns) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
My amendment to this bill would clarify and reinforce the intent of
Congress that nuclear cooperation into which the governments of the
United States and India would enter is for peaceful and productive
purposes and not military purposes. And I think a lot of us who view
this bill have some concerns.
Now, the intent of this amendment is obviously woven throughout this
legislation, but I thought an elevated position by a sense of Congress
in what we are talking about perhaps would alleviate some of the
colleagues, particularly the gentleman from Massachusetts. It bears
reiterating that this country stands for peace and not war.
While India has agreed to allow monitoring at 14 of their nuclear
reactors to ensure fuel is not used for weapons, my colleagues, there
are eight other reactors and an unknown number of future reactors that
can produce material for military purposes, free of any oversight or
control. It is, indeed, obviously, an improvement in the status quo for
India to open up any of its reactors to oversight, but the dangers
inherent in further assisting India's nuclear development are clear.
These are unsettling times in nuclear proliferation. Iran and North
Korea, for example, have violated their responsibilities under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and are producing or attempting to
produce significant arsenals of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was aided and
abetted with nuclear capability.
Support for today's legislation, and for broader cooperation with
India, crosses party lines. We all understand that. We all support
India. It is a burgeoning multiethnic, multireligious, free market
democracy, has a firm rule of law and respect for personal liberties.
These are all good. As such, India presents a hearty example, like the
United States, for the world to follow. Clearly, the nation of India is
and should be our friend, and we respect it.
However, my colleagues, India has refused to sign, as mentioned
before, the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It refuses to accept
full scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over
all its nuclear facilities, and India continues to produce fissile
materials for its growing nuclear arsenal. These have been brought to
our attention.
But, moreover, India is no stranger to violating international
nuclear commitments to use nuclear assistance for civilian purposes. In
1974, it detonated a nuclear bomb manufactured using plutonium from a
Canadian-supplied nuclear reactor, with heavy water provided by the
U.S. Both countries had provided India with nuclear technology based on
commitment to peaceful use.
Now, my colleagues, the former chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Sam Nunn, wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal: ``There
is every reason to suspect that Pakistan and China will react to this
deal by ratcheting up their own suspicions and nuclear activities,
including making additional weapons material and weapons.''
So, Mr. Chairman, we should avoid fanning the flames here of a
regional nuclear arms race. I think all of us remember President
Reagan's words when he mentioned in a radio address on April 17, 1982,
``A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought . . . ''
So I think this amendment is basically a sense of Congress, a
straightforward sense, to give us more assurance that what we are
trying to do here is to help them in a peaceful way. We seek friendship
and peace with all nations, particularly India, but we will not
purchase this friendship with nuclear arms.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STEARNS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
thank him for his amendment.
During consideration of this agreement in committee, members
expressed some of the same concerns raised by the gentleman from
Florida, and we added language to the underlying bill to alleviate
those concerns. I offered an amendment, a successful amendment, in
committee that explicitly states that nothing in this bill shall
violate our article I NPT obligation, not to, in any way, assist,
encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Now, the gentleman's amendment further clarifies that the aiding of
India's strategic program is not Congress's intent. And with that, we
are quite prepared to accept the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. STEARNS. That is very good. I appreciate that. Can I just ask you
a question? Nowhere in the bill does it

[[Page H5920]]

mention anything about private corporations or corporations in the
United States of America.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida's time has expired.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time
in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from California
is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept the gentleman's
amendment.
This amendment restates longstanding U.S. policy that the United
States will not support the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
weapons. This is, of course, longstanding U.S. policy. And we all agree
that it should continue.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend from California,
distinguished former ambassador of the United States, Congresswoman
Diane Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank Congressman Lantos for yielding.
The United States has few, if any, better friends than India. And I
feel strongly that the United States and India are destined to be great
partners as they seek to meet the challenges of the 21st century. One
of these challenges is the need to develop new sources of energy. The
Indian economy is growing by leaps and bounds, offering new
opportunities not only for India itself but for India's partners as
well. India will need to develop tens of thousands of megawatts of new
power capacity in the next few years to meet this need and lift India's
poorest from poverty.
But there is another 21st century challenge that India and the United
States must meet together, and that is the challenge of nuclear
proliferation, particularly the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands
of extremist governments and terrorist movements.
India is, and has been, a trusted partner in meeting this challenge.
As much as any ally of the United States, India knows the dangers posed
by terrorism. We were so sadly reminded of this again, only a few weeks
ago, when extremists murdered over 200 Indian commuters in Mumbai. My
sincerest sympathies go out to the people of Mumbai and all of India.
Together, I have no doubt we will eventually defeat the ideologies that
spark such terror attacks as well as defeat the poverty and
marginalization which fuels it.
I have no doubt that India is a reliable steward of nuclear
technology. But my concerns extends beyond India. I do not fear India
with nuclear power. I do fear a world where both India and the United
States must face a nuclear Iran or a nuclear North Korea. Our key tool
for constraining the nuclear design of Iran and North Korea has been
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But I fear that this legislation
will damage the NPT to the point that we will make it harder to stop
the Iranian and North Korea nuclear programs.
The U.S./India partnership is too strong to be harmed by one piece of
legislation. I believe that, if we continue working with India, we can
find ways to address our mutual security concerns and energy needs. But
I feel this legislation fails to meet either challenge.
Furthermore, I have concerns about our own constitutional processes
here in the United States. Acceptance or rejection of any arrangement
with India must include a full role for the United States Congress. The
President cannot change American law without Congress's consent. I
believe any such agreement with any foreign country must be approved by
Congress.

{time} 1915

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to our
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for
2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend, Mr. Lantos. I want
to commend you and Chairman Hyde for your leadership on this very, very
important bill.
I strongly support the bill. I support Mr. Stearns' amendment,
because I think it dovetails very nicely with the bill, and I support a
new strategic partnership with India. This is extremely important for
the United States in the 21st century.
India being the largest democracy and the United States being the
oldest democracy have so much in common, and this is a chance for us to
prove it. We have similar geopolitical interests in the region. We
understand the fact that India and the United States have much in
common. What may have kept us apart during the Cold War no longer is
relevant.
We have a strong Indian-American community in the United States,
further strengthening the ties between our two great nations; and we
have a common battle in the fight against terrorism. India, of course,
experienced that terrible bombing on the railroad; and we in the United
States understand what terrorism is as well.
India is a nuclear power. It is a reality. It is a fact of life. And
the fact that India is willing to cooperate with the United States with
nuclear power is a plus for us.
We should not treat friends and adversaries alike. People who say,
well, you know, if you are going to help India, how can you tell Iran
not to have nuclear power? That analogy is, frankly, ridiculous,
because India has shown time and time again it is a peaceful, loving
nation, with the same interests as the United States, whereas Iran is
continuing its mischief. We know that Iran and North Korea should not
be treated the same as India.
So I think what the Congress is doing, what Mr. Lantos and Mr. Hyde
have done with their bill, is a very tremendous asset to this country's
future in working with India. India has more than a billion people, and
India is growing in leaps and bounds in every step of the way.
This strategic partnership will not only be with nuclear, but it will
be with all things, because we will continue to build up trust with
India, we will continue to build up a working relationship with India.
Again, we don't have wishes to quarrel with any country, but when it
comes to the region in Asia, India has the same concerns, and there are
many, that we do, and that is why it pays to work with India and
particularly with nuclear power.
I support Mr. Stearns' amendment, I support the underlying bill, H.R.
5682, and I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on both.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas:
In section 2(6)(D), strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
In section 2(7)(B), strike the period at the end and insert
``; and''.
In section 2, add at the end the following new paragraph:
(8) the South Asia region is so important that the United
States should continue its policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and
Pakistan.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and a Member opposed will each
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to offer this amendment, along with my
distinguished colleague, Mr. Burton of Indiana. Might I say that I also
add my support for the manager's amendment which draws upon the change
that focuses on naming the bill after Chairman Hyde. I add my
appreciation for his service as well.

[[Page H5921]]

Mr. Chairman, I also rise to speak on behalf of H.R. 5682 as I offer
my amendment and offer the amendment with Mr. Burton, and that is that
this particular legislation, the United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act, is an opportunity. It is an opportunity for
further negotiation. It is an opportunity for friendship and the
continuation of that friendship. It is a recognition that even though
India has not signed the nonproliferation agreement, it has peacefully
utilized nuclear energy for the many years of its utilization. It is a
democracy.
So my amendment speaks to the whole concept of the importance of
South Asia; and it says that former President Clinton got it right when
we traveled with him to that region, Members of Congress, a small
delegation of eight. We went to India and we went to Pakistan because
we believed in the cohesion and the importance of that particular
region.
Might I note that in particular, as it relates to this legislation,
the Nuclear Supply Group, NSG, still is maintained in this bill, and
the guidelines and consensus decisionmaking are upheld. So, again, I
emphasize that it is an opportunity.
My amendment builds on that opportunity. Its language is direct. What
it says is that South Asia is an important region and that it is in our
national interests to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration,
exchanges with and between India and Pakistan, particularly since this
has served the Nation well. It goes on to emphasize the importance of
that relationship.
Why is that relationship important? Because we have seen in these
latter years the working relationship between them and the United
States. Pakistan has been a loyal and unwavering ally in our global war
on terror and has played a decisive role in helping to remove the
Taliban regime from Pakistan and the capture of hundreds of wanted al
Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has suffered thousands of casualties and has
been a victim of numerous terrorist acts.
In addition, the founder of Pakistan, Dr. Jinnah, premised the basis
of this country on democratic principles. The alliance of the United
States with the nation in South Asia should continue and the U.S.
should emphasize in its foreign policy the importance of the region,
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. South Asia is important to the United
States and the amendment further supports the need for encouraging
celloboration and engagement with and between India and Pakistan by the
U.S.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Burton).
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Let me just say I support the amendment.
I have been concerned about the problems between India and Pakistan
for a long, long time, particularly in the area of Kashmir. They are
talking now. Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf have been
trying to work out some differences. I know it is a very thorny issue
and one that is going to take some time, but they are talking. They
have opened up not only a dialogue but a small opening in the area
between Pakistan and India in the Kashmiri area.
This is a problem that must be solved. It should be solved. It could
be a flash point for another war over there. Since India and Pakistan
are both nuclear powers, anything we can do to reduce that threat and
make sure peace reigns is very important.
I support the gentlewoman's amendment and am proud to be a cosponsor.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding; and I
just wanted to say I thank her and Mr. Burton for their amendment. I
think it is very important that the United States be engaged on the
subcontinent, and I think the gentlewoman from Texas and the gentleman
from Indiana should be commended for their good work on this amendment.
We are prepared to accept that amendment.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I yield to the distinguished ranking member
from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my good friend from Texas
for yet another constructive step. She makes so many in this body. I am
strongly in support of her amendment and urge my colleagues to do
likewise.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank
the distinguished gentlemen.
Just for the record, I know there has been mention of an arms race.
We don't see an arms race with India. The recent comment of a
spokesperson from Pakistan indicated they do not want an arms race in
the region.
So I would say that this is an important step. We need to engage. We
need to work with India and Pakistan together. I ask my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the United States' relationship with India and Pakistan
is of paramount importance to our nations' political and economic
future. With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the
new realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have
embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This
means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an
especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the
world, with all nation-states.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple. My amendment is important. My
amendment is necessary. And my amendment is bipartisan. Due to the
strategic political and economic importance of the South Asia region,
it is imperative to our national interest to continue our policy of
engagement collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and
Pakistan, particularly since this has served the nation well in the
past.
My amendment, which is endorsed and co-sponsored by Congressman
Burton, and which is not opposed by either the Majority or Minority of
the Committee on International Relations, simply states that the
``South Asia region is so important that the United States should
continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with
and between India and Pakistan.''
Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S.
foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that
minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be
best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation
between India and the United States.
Similarly, Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on
terror. Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United
States. Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's
relationship with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it
may give pause to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason
why it is vital for the United States to continue to engage both
Pakistan and India in ongoing political engagement, economic and
technological collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring
the United States closer to these two vitally important democracies in
the South Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each
other.
As a founding Co-Chair of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, I am
wholeheartedly committed to the political, economic, and social
amelioration of Pakistan for the Pakistani people and the ascendancy of
Pakistan in the international community. Pakistan has been a loyal and
unwavering ally in our global war on terror, which has played a
decisive role in helping to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan
and the capture of hundreds of wanted al-Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has
suffered thousands of casualties and has been a victim of numerous
terrorist acts on their own soil because of their steadfast alliance
with our nation in the global war on terror.
In order to get a proper perspective on Pakistan, I believe we must
take a look back at the luminary individual who is singularly
responsible for its creation. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim
states in the world, is a living and exemplary monument of Muhammad Ali
Jinnah. Becoming an architect of a dream first articulated by poet-
philosopher Muhammed Allama Iqbal, a brilliant young lawyer named
Muhammad Ali Jinnah valiantly dedicated his life to achieving an
independent Pakistan for Indian Muslims. Revered as the father of
Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah inspired the adulation of his people
through his eloquence, perseverance and dauntless courage. For over 30
years, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the prominent leader of Indian Muslims
who articulately gave expression, coherence, and direction to their
legitimate aspirations and transformed their dreams into a concrete
reality. A visionary leader who was ahead of his time, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah was a great constitutionalist and nation-builder who called for
the equal rights of all Pakistani citizens without regard to their
religion.
In the past six decades, the people and nation of Pakistan has come a
long way. The bonds of friendship which began with Muhammad Ali Jinnah
continue today with President Musharraf. I am grateful to the people
and government of Pakistan, who in the aftermath

[[Page H5922]]

of the devastation and loss of innocent life which occurred on 9/11,
and on the eve of the 5 year anniversary of 9/11, continue to support
our efforts to stamp out international terrorism. Similarly, I think it
is critical that we continue our policy of engagement, collaboration,
and exchanges with and between the people and the governments of
Pakistan and India.
I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Does anyone claim time in opposition to the
amendment?
If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sherman

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Sherman:
In section 4(b), add at the end the following new
paragraph:
(8) The amount of domestic uranium used in India's military
program during a 12-month period ending on the date of the
determination is equal to or less than the amount of domestic
uranium used in India's military program during the 12-month
period ending on July 18, 2005.
In section 4, insert after subsection (o) the following new
subsection (and redesignate subsequent subsections
accordingly):

(p) Annual Certification; Termination of Cooperation.--
Nuclear cooperation with India shall be terminated unless one
year after making the determination described in subsection
(b)(8), and annually thereafter, the president certifies that
during the previous 12-month period the amount of domestic
uranium used in India's military program is equal to or less
than the amount of domestic uranium used in India's military
program during the 12-month period ending on July 18, 2005.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Sherman) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, India is a democracy and it knows that this Congress
has a role to play. They negotiated a deal which is better than the
deal they need. That deal which they negotiated with our State
Department is very loose on the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. India knows, or at least expects, that this Congress will do
its job and make the agreement better, tighten the agreement so that it
does not help India to build additional nuclear weapons.
The question is whether this Congress will do its job or surprise the
Indians and simply be a rubber stamp for the agreement that has already
been negotiated. I hope we do our job, and here is why.
India did not sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. They are not in
violation of it. They exploded nuclear weapons. I do not believe that
we should punish India for its decision to become a nuclear power, but
we should not facilitate India in building additional nuclear weapons.
India's problem is this: They can only produce a limited amount of
uranium from domestic sources, basically 300 tons. What they get out of
this deal is nuclear fuel and uranium.
How does India use its 300 tons, which it produces domestically? They
use half of it for their civilian reactors already existing. They
certainly lose money if they fail to run those reactors as scheduled at
full capacity. But they are doing just that. They are running their
existing civilian reactors at less than capacity because they only use
150 tons of uranium for that purpose. The other 150 tons goes to
India's nuclear weapons program.
What will this bill do if we fail to amend it? It will allow India to
buy uranium for all of its civilian needs from other countries. The
result will be that India will be able to use all 300 tons of its
domestic production for the construction of nuclear weapons.
That is not what we mean to do. We mean to help India develop its
civilian program. But since uranium is fungible, we also do not mean
that our help to India in giving it fuel for its civilian program is
not supposed to, so we are told, help India double its production of
nuclear weapons. That is why this bill needs an amendment.
What my amendment would do is simply require that, for the deal to go
forward, India keeps doing what it has been doing, using 150 tons of
its uranium for its existing civilian plants instead of diverting that
150 tons toward its military production. That is to say, we would make
sure that this deal did not hamper, but did not help, India's nuclear
weapons program.
I hope the amendment will enjoy support.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
distinguished chairman of the International Relations Committee, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this is a killer amendment. If you vote for
it, you vote to kill this entire initiative, because this imposes
limits on India's nuclear weapons program, but India already possesses
nuclear weapons and is extremely unlikely to give them up. Recognizing
this fact is recognizing reality.
This is a restriction imposed by the Sherman amendment that we impose
on no other nuclear power, with the exception of North Korea, which may
have nuclear weapons. This, as I have said, is a deal killer. Both
India has said so and the administration has said so, and a vote for
this amendment is a vote to kill the agreement.
So, with respect, I urge defeat of this amendment.

{time} 1930

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding me time.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment. Mr. Chairman, this amendment
was presented to the Committee on International Relations and was
overwhelmingly defeated because it is a killer amendment. It would kill
the entire nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
Legislation already provides that we should be proceeding with a
multilateral moratorium or treaty to ban the production of fissile
material. The legislation before us already states this. The underlying
legislation requires detailed reporting on the steps India and the
United States are taking to complete such a ban. It also requires
reports on India's production of fissile material, so that we can try
to conduct oversight over this important issue.
The Fortenberry amendment that the House is considering today will
strengthen this reporting even further. In reality, however, this
amendment is intended as a deal killer. I urge all of my colleagues to
rely on the underlying text, and I firmly oppose this amendment.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this is a great amendment. Because right
now this is how much nuclear material is needed by India to produce
nuclear electricity in their country. It is used for electricity.
However, once we provide them all of this nuclear material for their
nuclear electricity, it is going to free up the same amount to make
nuclear bombs.
So they can go from 7 a year to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year. Well,
they are saying they do not want to do that. And the proponents of this
treaty are saying, they are not going to do that. What the Sherman
amendment says is, the President must certify each year that they do
not do that. That is why the Sherman amendment is the deal maker,
because it proves what is being said is actually the truth.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, as Congressman Markey just said, as this
proposal now stands, there is nothing stopping India from using more
and more of its domestic uranium for weapons program. Without the
safeguards provided by the Sherman amendment, India could produce
dozens more nuclear weapons per year under the U.S.-

[[Page H5923]]

India deal, which would surely lead to an arms race with neighboring
rival Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, I am a great supporter of India and of stronger U.S.-
India relations. India is the world's largest democracy. It has
contributed measurably to the legacy of peace of the great leader
Mahatma Ghandi. India's long-standing goal of universal nuclear
disarmament has not been acknowledged enough in this debate
This proposal will be harmful to security in India, in the region and
the world. And this proposal will be harmful to the people of India in
that it could escalate an arms race between India and Pakistan.
I support Representative Sherman's amendment, which requires the
President to certify annually that India is not dedicating more
domestic uranium to its weapons program, as a condition for the U.S. to
cooperate with India on nuclear technology.
Pakistan wants a deal with the U.S. on nuclear technology, but the
U.S. has refused. Instead, Pakistan has turned to China for this
technology. To add fuel to the fire, it was just reported that Pakistan
has begun building a powerful new reactor for producing plutonium,
signaling a major expansion of the country's nuclear weapons
capabilities.
Instead of giving India more uranium to develop nuclear weapons, the
United States should take leadership in preventing an arms race in the
region. A good first step would be to pass the Sherman amendment.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the arguments. They say that India
claims this is a killer amendment. This a negotiating tactic. Any
amendment I don't like is a killer amendment. I use the negotiating
tactic myself.
We are told this imposes a requirement on India that we do not impose
on the other nuclear powers. All the other nuclear powers sign the
nonproliferation treaty. India deliberately puts itself in a class by
itself.
We are told that this bill, this amendment is designed to be a killer
amendment. I don't think the gentleman meant that as an attack on my
belief and integrity. I voted for the bill. I do not intend to kill the
bill.
The Democratic leader was on this floor endorsing another amendment
that India says is a killer amendment. I do not think she intends to
kill the bill. She said she was going to vote for it. Those of us who
want to improve the bill want to improve it. And if we are nothing more
than a rubber stamp for a deal which by its terms will allow India to
double its nuclear weapons production, all in the name of generating
electricity, then we are not doing our job. Please vote for the
amendment.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I
will note that the base text of this bill, in section 402, already asks
for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. But the
gentleman's amendment would make such a certification a condition for
the deal.
Let me also say that people recognize that India has great demand for
expanding its energy grid to create electricity for its people. Let me
say that the gentleman has taken a unique approach to this issue for
which he should be commended. We sympathize with his concerns.
However, I do not see the amendment as even workable. I do not know
that such a determination with a high degree of confidence could even
be made. So I am concerned about terminating the agreement with India
on such a certification that cannot even be made with any certitude.
Mr. Chairman, for some of these reasons, this amendment was defeated
in committee by a vote of 10-32 when it was offered. I urge the House
to do the same.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
noes appeared to have it.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Berman

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Berman
In section 4(d), add at the end the following new
paragraph:
(5) Limitation on nuclear transfers to india.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for
nuclear cooperation with India pursuant to section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved
pursuant to this Act, nuclear transfers to India shall not
include source material and special nuclear material (as
defined in section 11 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2014)) unless
the President determines that India--
(A) is adhering to a unilateral moratorium on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
(B) is adhering to a multilateral moratorium on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; or
(C) has signed and is adhering to a multilateral treaty
prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons.

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Berman) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Royce) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my co-author of
this amendment, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Berman for his hard work
with me on this issue. I commend Chairman Hyde, for whom I have
tremendous affection, for having this bill named after him.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment that Mr. Berman and I are offering is the
single strongest step Congress can take to ensure that the civilian
nuclear cooperation agreement with India does not lead to a nuclear
arms race in South Asia.
Our amendment would allow exports of nuclear reactors and other
technology to India, our good friend. But it would prevent the export
of nuclear reactor fuel until India has ceased production of fissile
material for use in nuclear weapons. The United States and the other
original nuclear weapons states have all agreed to a voluntary
moratorium on fissile material production.
But under the bill as currently written, India will receive all of
the benefits of a nuclear state under the nonproliferation treaty
without being obligated to halt the production of fissile material,
without having to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty, or to take
other steps toward disarmament.
Requiring that India commit to ceasing the production of bomb
material, in exchange for all of the benefits of nuclear trade, without
asking for it to take any other responsibilities of a nuclear power is
the bare minimum we should require to improve United States' national
security.
The bill before us makes drastic exceptions to established
nonproliferation rules. Currently India's production of weapons-grade
plutonium is constrained by the requirements of its nuclear power
reactors and its limited supply of natural uranium. But the civil-
military separation plan offered by India excludes from national
international inspection military facilities and spent fuel.
This provides India with a substantial capability to increase its
nuclear weapons arsenal. If the bill goes ahead as is, the foreign
supply of nuclear fuel to India would free up their existing limited
capacity of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons.
It is therefore responsible and prudent for Congress to ensure
through this legislation that as a simple price of having access to
sensitive nuclear technology, India declare a moratorium on productions
of fissile material, just as the U.S. and other nuclear powers have.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
chairman of the International Relations Committee (Mr. Hyde).
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I announce my difficulty in opposing my good

[[Page H5924]]

friends, Mr. Berman and Mrs. Tauscher. They are both very learned in
this field.
However, this amendment is very similar to Mr. Sherman's amendment
and should be defeated for virtually the same reasons. India already
possesses nuclear weapons, and is very unlikely to dispose of them or
be divested of them.
This is a restriction that the U.S. imposes on no other nuclear
power. Therefore, instead of proliferating good will it would
proliferate bad will to impose this on India.
This is the proverbial deal killer, as the Sherman amendment was. A
vote for this amendment is a vote to kill the agreement even if the
bill passes. So, with considerable regret I must urge the defeat of
this amendment
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I regret but I must strongly oppose this
amendment offered by my good friend from California. This amendment was
carefully considered by the International Relations Committee and was
overwhelming defeated on a bipartisan vote.
It is a killer amendment, which would destroy this historic piece of
legislation, and I think it would be irresponsible for us to hazard
that strong probability.
Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, first I point out that while this amendment was
defeated decisively, it was not defeated overwhelming.
Secondly, and I say this with great respect both to Chairman Hyde and
Ranking Member Lantos, who not only do great work here, but made this a
significantly better bill by virtue of their efforts.
Let's review the bidding here. The U.S. went into this discussion
saying, India, we want you to cut off fissile material production.
India said no. The administration backed off its position.
I now offer an amendment that simply denies the fuel until such time
as they cut off their fissile material production. The administration
says it is a killer amendment. The language that they proposed in a
weakened form now, they call a killer amendment.
Let's test the proposition here. Give a good vote to this amendment.
As Mr. Sherman and Mr. Markey pointed out, we are incentivizing, if we
provide the fuel, we are incentivizing a massive potential increases in
India's nuclear weapon production.
What is China going to do? I am not that worried about India. But
India has minimal deterrent capabilities against China right now. What
is China going to do? China right now has halted its fissile material
production. Will they continue to do that once this passes?
What will they do with Pakistan in the Nuclear Suppliers Group? At
least, thank heavens, we will have a chance to see this agreement when
it is finally negotiated after the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided.

{time} 1945

But don't just accept the words it is a killer amendment. Give this a
good vote. Let India know we are very serious about this. Reinforce the
administration's commitment to this issue which wavered in the
negotiation of India. This issue goes far beyond U.S.-India
relationships. It goes on with what happens with the nuclear powers and
with the spread of nuclear weapons. It will have ramifications far
beyond the U.S.-India relationship.
This is a modest amendment. This is the amendment Sam Nunn proposes.
This allows reactor technology and all of the other facets of a
civilian nuclear cooperation to go ahead. It just says no fuel until
you have decided to cut off fissile material production.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 1 minute to the
chairman of the International Relations Committee.
Mr. HYDE. I was simply going to suggest to my good friend, Mr.
Berman, that while you are looking for patterns of conduct, think of
the Libya example. Mr. Khadaffi might just turn in all their weapons.
That is entirely possible.
Mr. BERMAN. Well, I do. But it wasn't because we gave Libya civilian
nuclear cooperation. But I wouldn't compare India and Libya. They are
very different countries. And the gain for Libya was a great gain for
nonproliferation, I agree. But now we are in a different situation.
Think of China, think of Pakistan, think of Iran, think of North Korea.
Mr. ROYCE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in opposition to the Berman amendment. I would like to commend
the gentleman from California for bringing this issue before the House
today, and I know that he does so having studied this issue very
closely.
The gentleman's amendment would prevent the full realization of this
agreement until India has put in place a cap, either unilaterally or
multilateral, on its fissile material production. That is a highly
unlikely or even an implausible scenario given the dynamics in the
region in South Asia.
This should, frankly, be a goal, and the administration should be
doing more on that front. But it should not be a mandate for this
agreement.
This amendment is not without merit. I offered a successful amendment
in committee that states that nothing in this bill shall violate our
Article I NPT obligation not to in any way assist, encourage, or induce
India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices. So I think Congress has made it clear that this is
not the intent of the agreement.
The gentleman is right that the language in the underlying bill is
not as strenuous as his proposal, but there is also an international
component to this agreement. We are opening the door for this
cooperation with India not only for the United States but for other
countries as well, and I don't see how the gentleman's amendment would
prevent the nuclear supplier group from approving such trade for other
countries, excluding only the U.S.
Let me also say I do believe that fulfilling this relationship with
India is in the interest of the United States. Indeed, and here is my
final point, if this amendment were to pass, it could in fact be
detrimental to U.S. interests from that perspective
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROYCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
But the Nuclear Suppliers Group operates on a consensus. If this
amendment is in the agreement, the United States will not support a
consensus position that allows another country to send nuclear fuel to
India
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
noes appeared to have it.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fortenberry

The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fortenberry
In section 4(o), add at the end the following new
paragraph:
(5) Growth in india's military fissile material
production.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on
which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United
States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f)
and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report that--
(i) measures the effectiveness of the civil nuclear
cooperation agreement in achieving the goals and objectives
described in section 2; and
(ii) assesses the relative level of India's nuclear fissile
material production compared to the previous year.
(B) Contents.--The report described in subparagraph (A)
shall also include information relating to--

[[Page H5925]]

(i) the amount of natural uranium India has mined and
milled during the previous year;
(ii) the amount of electricity India's civilian reactors
have produced during the previous year;
(iii) the amount of domestic natural uranium India has
used to produce electricity during the previous year;
(iv) the amount of fissile material India has produced for
military purposes during the previous year;
(v) the amount of domestic natural uranium and domestic
enrichment capacity India has used to produce such fissile
material;
(vi) the amount of domestic uranium India has otherwise
stockpiled for possible civil or military use;
(vii) an identification of any changes with regard to these
quantities from the previous year; and
(viii) any additional qualitative factors determined to be
relevant with respect to subparagraph (A), as appropriate,
such as the location of production facilities.
(C) Preparation; form of report.--The report should rely on
public information to the extent possible. The report shall
include a classified annex if necessary.
(D) Hearings.--The Committees specified in subparagraph (A)
may, after consideration of each report under this paragraph,
hold hearings with government and non-government witnesses as
each Committee determines necessary to evaluate each report.

Modification to Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fortenberry

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the
amendment with the modification placed at the desk.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fortenberry:
In section 4(o), add at the end the following new
paragraph:
(5) Growth in india's military fissile material
production.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on
which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United
States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f)
and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report that--
(i) measures the effectiveness of the civil nuclear
cooperation agreement in achieving the goals and objectives
described in section 2; and
(ii) assesses the relative level of India's nuclear fissile
material production compared to the previous year.
(B) Contents.--The report described in subparagraph (A)
shall also include information relating to--
(i) the amount of natural uranium India has mined and
milled during the previous year;
(ii) the amount of electricity India's civilian reactors
have produced during the previous year;
(iii) the amount of domestic natural uranium India has
used in its declared civilian reactors to produce electricity
during the previous year;
(iv) the amount of fissile material India has produced for
military purposes during the previous year;
(v) the amount of domestic natural uranium and domestic
enrichment capacity India has used to produce such fissile
material;
(vi) the amount of domestic uranium India has otherwise
stockpiled for possible civil or military use;
(vii) an identification of any changes with regard to these
quantities from the previous year; and
(viii) any additional qualitative factors determined to be
relevant with respect to subparagraph (A), as appropriate,
such as the location of production facilities.
(C) Preparation; form of report.--The report should rely on
public information to the extent possible. The report shall
include a classified annex if necessary.

Mr. FORTENBERRY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the modification be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Nebraska?
There was no objection.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
There was no objection.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman
from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consumed.
(Mr. FORTENBERRY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer
this amendment to H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. The purpose of this amendment is to
provide Congress with the ability to assess, to the extent possible,
whether U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India may potentially
contribute to growth in India's military fissile material production.
The amendment is straightforward. It simply calls for a report each
year to ensure that the United States is not unintentionally complicit
in the growth of India's nuclear weapons capabilities.
First of all, let me express my appreciation to Chairman Hyde and
Ranking Member Lantos and the House International Relations Committee
staff for their efforts to address a wide variety of concerns expressed
by members of the International Relations Committee.
Given the global significance of this potential agreement, I believe
it is important to remain diligent in the conduct of our oversight
responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, civil nuclear cooperation with India is a bilateral
initiative with wide-ranging multilateral implications. The
nonproliferation, energy and environmental objectives of this proposed
agreement with India are laudable; and the Committee on International
Relations has emphasized the need to ensure that such an agreement
would not result in unintended consequences which may undermine its
purpose and directly or indirectly result in boosting India's military
nuclear capabilities.
It is my expectation that the International Relations Committee will
avail itself of this opportunity to hold as many hearings as necessary
to examine the content of this report and the potential implications
for the U.S. compliance with Article I of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as referenced in the bill.
This is particularly important in light of the recent news regarding
the discovery of a reactor project which would enable Pakistan to make
many more nuclear weapons each year. This news highlights very real
concerns about a potential arms race in South Asia. It is up to
Congress to ensure that any U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement remains
just that, a civil nuclear agreement which will have no impact on the
production of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member
Lantos are in support of this amendment, and I am grateful for their
support.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
As we have noted before, the underlying bill in section 402 already
asks for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. The
gentleman from Nebraska's amendment asks for an additional report
building on the report in the underlying bill. We are willing to accept
that amendment
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FORTENBERRY. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my friend from Nebraska.
We are pleased to accept his amendment. It strengthens the underlying
legislation. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. I thank the gentleman and appreciate all of his hard
work.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Does anyone claim time in opposition to the
amendment?
The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings
will now resume on those amendments printed in part B of House Report
109-599 on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following
order:
Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Stearns of Florida.
Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Sherman of California.
Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Berman of California.

[[Page H5926]]

The first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote.
Remaining electronic votes will be conducted as 5-minute votes.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stearns

The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Stearns) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414,
noes 0, not voting 18, as follows:

[Roll No. 407]

AYES--414

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Oberstar
Obey
Ortiz
Osborne
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--18

Boustany
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
Evans
Ford
Gonzalez
Istook
Jones (OH)
Kelly
McHenry
McKinney
Miller (FL)
Murphy
Nussle
Olver
Pryce (OH)
Sweeney
Wexler

{time} 2017

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California changed his vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. MILLER of Florida. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sherman

The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Sherman) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 155,
noes 268, not voting 9, as follows:

[Roll No. 408]

AYES--155

Abercrombie
Allen
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barton (TX)
Becerra
Berman
Berry
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boucher
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Conyers
Costello
Cummings
Davis (CA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Fortenberry
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gohmert
Goode
Green, Al
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hefley
Hinchey
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Lewis (GA)
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Otter
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Ramstad
Ross
Rothman
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Serrano
Sherman
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Woolsey
Wu

NOES--268

Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Andrews
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Berkley
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman

[[Page H5927]]

Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Cleaver
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Costa
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (AL)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Tom
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Gene
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lantos
Latham
LaTourette
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Ortiz
Osborne
Oxley
Pallone
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salazar
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Strickland
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Towns
Turner
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--9

Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
Evans
Ford
Gonzalez
Istook
McKinney
Nussle
Wexler

Announcement by the Acting Chairman

The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 2028

Messrs. WU, GUTIERREZ, and POMEROY changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Berman

The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Berman) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 184,
noes 241, not voting 7, as follows

[Roll No. 409]

AYES--184

Abercrombie
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barton (TX)
Becerra
Berman
Berry
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emerson
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Harman
Hefley
Herseth
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Inslee
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nunes
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Otter
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Price (NC)
Ramstad
Ross
Rothman
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Serrano
Sherman
Sherwood
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu

NOES--241

Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Berkley
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carnahan
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (AL)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emanuel
Engel
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hensarling
Herger
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lantos
Latham
LaTourette
Levin
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Ortiz
Osborne
Oxley
Pallone
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salazar
Saxton
Schmidt
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Sodrel
Strickland
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--7

Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
Evans
Istook
McKinney
Nussle
Wexler

Announcement by the Acting Chairman

The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised that 2
minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 2036

Mr. MEEK of Florida changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''

[[Page H5928]]

So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Bishop of Utah) having assumed the chair, Mr. Gutknecht, Acting
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union,
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill
(H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India,
pursuant to House Resolution 947, he reported the bill, as amended
pursuant to that rule, back to the House with further sundry amendments
adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will
put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.

Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Markey

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. MARKEY. In its current form, I am opposed to the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Markey moves to recommit the bill H.R. 5682 to the
Committee on International Relations with instructions to
report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
In section 4(b), add at the end the following new
paragraph:
(8) India is fully and actively participating in United
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary,
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability
(including the capability to enrich or process nuclear
materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass
destruction.

Mr. MARKEY (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, this recommittal motion requires that
nuclear cooperation with India can only commence after the President
has determined that India is fully and actively participating in United
States' efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
including a nuclear weapons capability, including the capability to
enrich or process nuclear materials and the means to deliver weapons of
mass destruction.
The motion does not kill or delay this bill in any way. If the House
approves this motion, the Committee on International Relations will
report the amended bill back to the House forthwith, meaning
immediately. We will go to final passage of the legislation.
As the Members know, the U.S. Government has made a determination
that Iran's nuclear program is a cover for a military program; and the
International Atomic Energy Agency has found Iran to be in violation of
their international safeguards commitments. The U.N. Security Council
is about to consider what action to take in response.
Even Russia and China have now said that they would support action at
the Security Council, potentially even sanctions, a position that could
not have been imagined previously. India is now the only global power
that has yet to get on board with the United States policy on Iran.
Clearly, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is a
paramount U.S. national security goal. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat
to our national security; and it is a threat to the security, indeed,
the very survival of our closest ally in the Middle East, the State of
Israel.
Let me at this time, Mr. Speaker, yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Upton).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has not been recognized for a
period of controlled debate and may not allocate or reserve time. The
gentleman may reclaim his time after 1 minute.
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I don't often speak or vote for motions to
recommit, but occasionally they do pass. And I would note that if this
motion to recommit does pass, the bill still comes to us in its final
form.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and I tried to offer
this amendment in the Rules Committee. I must say that in our testimony
in the Rules Committee upstairs yesterday, I thought we had pretty good
support on both sides of the aisle for this amendment from those that
were there.
Iran is a bad player. This bill helps India. Why don't we have India
on our side as we work against Iran in the world community? That is
what this motion to recommit says. It says that the President has to
certify that India is on our side as they work for nuclear capability
in the world community and to keep Iran on the other side. Why aren't
we working together, India and the United States, as we look at Iran in
terms of more of the mischief that they are promoting around the world?
Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.
I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this motion. In committee
deliberations, we have made it clear to India that they must make a
choice between Tehran and Washington. They have done so twice at votes
in Vienna at the International Atomic Energy Agency. This recommittal
motion dramatically strengthens the underlying legislation. I urge all
of my colleagues to vote for it.
Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.
Could I ask the Chair how much time is remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 1\1/2\
minutes remaining of the 5.
Mr. MARKEY. I yield myself the remainder of my time.
As the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from California have
pointed out, there has been a series of statements made by the Indian
government that have left a great deal of ambiguity with regard to how
strong they will stand with us in our effort to take Iran to the
Security Council to ensure that Iran does not use its uranium and
plutonium programs in order to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons
program.
The recommittal motion that I am propounding here this evening just
follows up on the statements that have been made out of the Indian
government so that they can understand what we expect from them, and we
will send a signal from this Congress to our negotiators as to what we
expect from them in eliciting from the Indian government. So I hope on
a bipartisan basis we can all agree that this Iranian nuclear program
is the very top foreign policy and defense threat not only to our
country but to countries throughout the Middle East.
I urge an ``aye'' vote on the recommittal motion.

{time} 2045

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, during the course of the committee's five
hearings on this agreement members closely scrutinized the relationship
between India and Iran, and I think it is fair to say that our
committee helped influence India's thinking on Iran. And I think we
should all remember that we are getting India's cooperation on Iran. We
got two IAEA votes out of India, including a critical vote to get the
Iran file to New York. That is the fact about cooperation.
We share the gentleman's concern about Iran, but our point is that
India is cooperating on Iran. And as we continue to engage India, and
this agreement is about India's growing energy needs, as we engage
India, we move them away from states like Iran. Rejection of the
agreement itself, frankly, could push India, theoretically, back
towards countries like Iran.

[[Page H5929]]

Also, we have Mr. Markey's theme in the bill itself. The bill itself
says to ``secure India's full and active participation in United States
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including
a nuclear weapons capability, and the means to deliver weapons of mass
destruction.'' If India breaks this agreement, then we, the United
States, will break our agreement with India.
And I think also it is important to remember that India and the
administration both say that they are cooperating on Iran quietly
behind the scenes. Why? Because this is the most effective way to do
it. And we have seen the positive results. But diplomacy cannot be
certified. The purpose of this agreement is to help establish broad
cooperation, to establish a partnership between India and the United
States. You do not compel a partner to cooperate. So this amendment is
both unworkable and contrary to the spirit of the new relationship we
are trying to establish with India.
How important is that relationship? Well, we have had two
administrations, the Clinton administration and the Bush
administration, forge closer ties with India and overcoming what we
remember only too well, the chilly relations of the Cold War. And last
July's joint statement committed each country to a global partnership
which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues, including
counterterrorism, including Iran.
The International Relations Committee have given this agreement close
and extensive review. While nuclear energy is controversial in the
United States, it is not in India. Like in several other countries,
nuclear energy is widely viewed as a critical technology for their
electricity, one central to uplifting hundreds of millions of
impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear energy sector,
not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it will nonetheless.
So this deal needs to go forward.
With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is
competing on the world market, competing with American consumers, for
limited hydrocarbon resources. This gives Americans an interest in
helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation
does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its highly
polluting coal, which is in our interest.
By passing this legislation, we also take a step toward
internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make
it safer. The agreement also is likely to increase India's cooperation
with us in confronting countries seeking to break their NPT commitment
by developing nuclear weapons, as it already has with Iran.
India must take more steps, including developing a credible plan to
separate its civilians and military nuclear facilities under the
agreement. Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that
the administration is negotiating with the Indians before the
technology is actually transferred. And as I said, should India break
the conditions of the agreement, the U.S. breaks off the agreement
itself.
So either we continue to try to box in India and hope for the best,
or we make this move, we engage India and hope to use our influence to
move this increasingly important country in our direction, making India
a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle against
Islamist terrorism.
That is why I ask my colleagues to please oppose this motion to
recommit and please vote for the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 192,
noes 235, not voting 6, as follows

[Roll No. 410]

AYES--192

Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Conyers
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Emerson
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Ford
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefley
Herseth
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Israel
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Melancon
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Ney
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Otter
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Simmons
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sweeney
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--235

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (AL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis, Tom
Delahunt
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Engel
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Oxley
Pallone
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Sodrel
Souder

[[Page H5930]]

Stearns
Strickland
Sullivan
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Towns
Turner
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--6

Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
Evans
Istook
McKinney
Wexler

{time} 2108

Mr. DENT changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. JOHNSON of Illinois changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 359,
noes 68, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 411]

AYES--359

Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Costa
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Tom
DeGette
Delahunt
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Honda
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McCrery
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Upton
Van Hollen
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Watt
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--68

Abercrombie
Baldwin
Becerra
Blumenauer
Capps
Conyers
Costello
Cummings
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dingell
Doggett
Farr
Goode
Grijalva
Harman
Hefley
Hinchey
Holt
Hooley
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kucinich
Langevin
Leach
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lynch
Markey
Marshall
Matsui
McDermott
McNulty
Miller, George
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Rothman
Sanders
Schwartz (PA)
Serrano
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Solis
Stark
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson (CA)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Waters
Watson
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Woolsey
Wu

NOT VOTING--6

Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
Evans
Istook
McKinney
Wexler

{time} 2117

So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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